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PRESERVING LIFE BY RANKING RIGHTS
John William Draper∗
Border walls, abortion, and the death penalty are the current
battlegrounds of the right to life.1 Events pertaining to any of these
areas tend to be newsworthy.2 All three issues pertain to the
protection of life from at least one viewpoint. We will visit each topic
and more in this Article, as we consider ranking groups of
constitutional rights.
The enumerated rights of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments—life, liberty, and property—merit special
attention. As a catchall series of largely exclusive categories of basic
rights,3 they can provide a systematic and just way to settle disputes
involving conflicts between life and other rights. The result would
prioritize and protect life, the most fundamental of rights.4
∗ Reference Librarian, Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Special
thanks go to Howard Lesnick, Stephanos Bibas, Frank Goodman, Mitch Berman, Greg Keating,
Jill Fisch, and Tamara Gaskell for the review of earlier drafts, helpful suggestions, and
encouragement. Also, deep gratitude for editorial prowess, insight, and patience goes to
Catherine Kemp, Stephen Maier, Elysaa Klein, Suzanne Foot, Anna Bonventre and all other
members of the Albany Law Review. All errors are mine.
1 See Jennifer Bendery, ‘Pro-Life,’ Pro- Family Groups Are MIA on Family Separations at
the Border, HUFFPOST (June 19, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/family-separatio
ns-border-immigration-pro-life_us_5b2918e6e4b0a4dc9921090c; Ethics Guide – Arguments
Against Capital Punishment, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/capitalpunishment/ against_1.
shtml (last visited Oct. 3, 2018); Introduction to the Abortion Debate, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk
/ethics/abortion/legal/introduction_1.shtml#h2 (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
2 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Challenges to Arizona’s Death Penalty
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/us/supreme-court-death
-penal ty.html (reporting that the Supreme Court turned down a request to consider whether
death penalty is constitutional throughout the nation); Reuters, In Quick Reversal, Trump
Threatens Shutdown Over Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytime s.com/r
euters/2018/09/05/us/politics/05reuters-usa-trump-shutdown.html (reporting that President
Trump threatened to shut down the U.S. government if Congress did not approve boarder wall
funding); Sabrina Tavernise, The Future of Abortion Under a New Supreme Court? Look to
Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/us/abortion-suprem
e-court-arkansas.html (reporting that current abortion cases in Arkansas may define the new
legal battle over abortion).
3 Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards”, 57 UCLA L. REV.
365, 370 (2009).
4 “[F]undamental rights analysis is simply no more than the modern recognition of the
natural law concepts first espoused by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull.” JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7, at 498 (8th ed. 2010) [hereinafter NOWAK
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This would be akin to medicine’s Hippocratic Oath5: first, do no
harm.6 Like medicine, law should protect life, not take it.
Should interests in liberty outweigh the right to life? Should
property interests do the same? American law and practice have
arrived at varying answers to these questions. Each individual life
merits more fairness, justice, and predictability than what our legal
system currently provides. We need to change our laws and practices
to help save lives.
Ranking life above liberty and property would constitute a new
constitutional principle based on an ordered interpretation of current
language.7 The principle has deep historical roots.8 Borrowing at
least part of the historical interpretation would save innocent lives
by focusing on cooperation rather than competition. Ranking life first
would probably reduce both consumption and pollution, supporting a
safer life for our descendants.
New global risks to life and health have rapidly developed,9 and
every day, we Americans—and all humans—enhance or reduce those
risks with our behavior. To save American lives, we must account for
risks that extend beyond our borders and change behavior that
contributes to these risks. Prioritizing the constitutional right to life
first helps us to understand, and to commit to, behavior that reduces
the creation of significant risk. The benefits of this mindset are
potentially manifold. First, it emphasizes respect for life and thus
helps to save lives. Secondly, reducing significant risks to life and
health for Americans also reduces risks for the entire planet. By
implementing this change in our laws, the United States could
increase its stature as a global role model for protecting human
rights.
Part I of this Article considers the interests that are the
precondition of our rights. Those interests have a hierarchy. They
& ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th ed.)].
5 See Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS (Mar. 27, 2001), http://www.pbs.org/wg
bh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html.
6 This rendition of the Oath is derived from Latin: primum non nocere. Primum Non Nocere,
MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/primum%20non%20noc ere
(last visited Oct. 3, 2018). For more on the history and uses of this phrase, see Cedric M. Smith,
Origin and Uses of Primum Non Nocere – Above All, Do No Harm!, 45 J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 371, 371 (2005).
7 See Daniel G. Bird, Note, Life on the Line: Pondering the Fate of a Substantive Due Process
Challenge to the Death Penalty, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1340–44 (2003) (arguing for a textbased right to life based on Due Process Clause).
8 See id. at 1340–46.
9 See Cf. John William Draper, Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than Follow NeoClassical Economics, 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 157, 163, 165–79 (2016) [hereinafter Draper, NeoClassical Economics] (evaluating the global risks to life and health of humanity).
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are not all equal or fungible. Some of those interests are basic and
cannot be substituted or traded for others. Interests can justify
rights. They can even justify institutions that come with their own
rights. Those rights, whether based with the individual or the
institution, are grounded by the duty to honor and protect those
interests and their hierarchy.
Part II narrows the focus to the right to life. It explores the
interests that are protected. Then, based on the hierarchy of
interests, it considers what should happen when rights to life conflict
with other rights.
The right to life is not infinite.
Some
circumstances may not qualify for protection by the right to life.
Some interests may be too tenuous to protect. Other interests in life
may conflict with other important interests or duties.
Part III explores a deeper and richer history of “life, liberty, and
property” long predating the eighteenth century drafting of the U.S.
Bill of Rights. Surprisingly, the earlier interpretation of these rights
offers a more nuanced and helpful approach to resolving conflicts
between different categories of rights. As we shall see, Juan de Lugo,
one of the Late Scholastics, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
Hispanic economic moral theorists, hit upon ranking those rights.10
In part, ranking was designed to help the innocent save their lives.11
Importantly, as a slight refinement of Thomistic legal thought, it is
consistent with the roots of Western law that predate the
Reformation.12 Thus, placing life above liberty and property is
consistent with our cultural foundation in Christian religion as
well.13
Part IV looks at the origin of special protections for “life, liberty,
and property” in U.S. law. The identity and order of Lugo’s interests
matches the appearance of those same rights in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.14
Lugo’s
interpretation, ranking life first, enables a new, safer constitutional
interpretation of John Locke’s and James Madison’s words.15 In
10 See ALEJANDRO A. CHAFUEN, FAITH AND LIBERTY: THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF THE LATE
SCHOLASTICS 44–45 (Samuel Gregg ed., 2d ed. 2003).
11 See id. at 45.
12 See id. at 25.
13 See, e.g., Paul Babie, Two Voices of the Morality of Private Property, 23 J.L. & RELIGION
271, 295–96 (2007–08) (referring to Christian teachings that value the right to life above
property).
14 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45 (understanding Lugo’s ranking of interests to be life,
liberty, and property); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
15 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45.
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particular, we each have an interest in life, and we need to feel
confident that our interest is actually a protected constitutional
right—and that others will honor their duties. Our history of
common law helps here, but substantive due process and regulatory
law may be problematic.
Part V considers and rejects the positions of many proponents of
neo-classical economic or utilitarian theory who advocate an equality
or equal ranking of basic or fundamental rights.16 This position
invites risk to human life by giving liberty and property rights the
same moral and legal value as life.17 In the interest of justice, neither
liberty nor property (including maximization of profit, income, or
wealth) should be of prime importance. Other rights and interests
should not be placed on par with life itself.
Part VI provides examples of inversions, which occur when lowerranked rights, such as liberty or property, are permitted to outrank
life,18 the most fundamental right.
Unfortunately, inversions
19
involving life turn out to be deadly. Through the implementation of
the value of statistical life (VSL)20 in governmental cost-benefit
analysis,21 risks of statistical death and significant adverse health
impacts turn out to be imposed to some degree on all of humanity.22

See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 159.
See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 62–63 (2004) (providing several historical examples
in which a life was equated to property rights).
18 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Zeal on Behalf of Vulnerable Clients, 93 N.C.L. REV. 1475,
1501 (2015) (arguing that the current structure of the legal system often ranks the right of
life below property rights).
19 See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 62–63.
20 “There is a substantial literature on the value of a statistical life.” Draper, Neo-Classical
Economics, supra note 9, at 208 n.221. Even if we could overlook the possible illegality of
statistical death, the implementation of VSL has a huge problem with valuation:
16
17

A future earnings standard is highly unequal; it makes some people appear more valuable
than others, because they will earn more in the rest of their lifetimes. Is it then more
“efficient” to spend more on protecting the health of those with higher expected earnings?
A price list with different values for different lives is difficult to reconcile with ideals of
democracy and equal treatment under the law, let alone the sacredness of every human
being.
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 71–72.
21 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 61 (using cost-benefit analysis, the
Environmental Protection Agency estimated that one human life is worth $6.1 million).
22 As bio-geographer Jared Diamond notes:
[T]he highest blood levels of toxic industrial chemicals and pesticides reported for any
people in the world are for Eastern Greenland’s and Siberia’s Inuit people (Eskimos), who
are also among the most remote from sites of chemical manufacture or heavy use. Their
blood mercury levels are nevertheless in the range associated with acute mercury
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Our activities and their consequences are part of a greater problem.
Global risk to life is both foreseeable and significant.
This Article focuses only on ranking life first, over both liberty and
property. It is a more modest and more easily defensible claim than
the complications of ranking liberty interests over property interests.
Ranking life first is also more important—and urgent.
Part VII discusses the implementation of the ranking with the
protection of life as the ultimate, fundamental right in U.S.
constitutional law. Not all risks to life require special treatment in
the law; only those that impose significant risks to life require
ranking. The emphasis here is on protection from inversions. Life
needs to be protected first—from all significant risks to life and
health. This way, life would be protected from the liberty and
property interests of others, but only when those interests pose a
significant risk to life or health. This ranking, implemented in U.S.
law, would support human rights and promote safer lives for our
descendants.
It may help for us to recognize that there is a global emergency
with our planet’s life support system23 and that we need to rank life
first as an appropriate and necessary measure to protect humanity.
However, requiring an emergency to engage the ranking is
unnecessary and places too many lives at risk.24 Instead, we should
focus not only on significant local and national risks, but on
significant international risks to the lives and health of U.S. citizens,
individually and collectively. Such significant risks largely represent
a blind spot in our current system of risk regulation.25
By using conceptual partitioning between life and other rights, we
poisoning, while the levels of toxic PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls) in Inuit mothers’
breast milk fall in a range high enough to classify the milk as “hazardous waste.” Effects
on the women’s babies include hearing loss, altered brain development, and suppressed
immune function, hence high rates of ear and respiratory infections.
JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 518 (2005).
23 See, e.g., William E. Rees, Confronting Collapse: Human Cognition and the Challenge for
Economics, in CONFRONTING ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE: ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY
FOR LAW, POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 288, 288–89 (Laura Westra et al. eds. 2013) (noting the
inability of a highly-educated humanity to operate within the carrying capacity of the planet);
Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 164–80 (noting a variety of risks to Earth’s
life support system).
24 See John William Draper, Human Survival, Risk, and Law: Considering Risk Filters to
Replace Cost-Benefit Analysis, 33 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 310 (2016) [hereinafter Draper,
Risk Filters]; Simon Hales et al., Quantitative Risk Assessment of the Effects of Climate Change
on Selected Causes of Death, 2030s and 2050s, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 2 (2014),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/134014/9789241507691_eng.pdf?sequence=1&
isAllowed=y.
25 See, Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 319.
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can solve difficult problems of incommensurability,26 provide a morejust legal system, and more effectively support a safer world for
ourselves and our descendants.
Conceptual partitioning for
persistence is part of a decision procedure that uses ordered
sequencing.27 The procedure provides a systematic approach to
dealing with certain categories of problems in the law—such as
incommensurability of rights.28 Operationally, ranking rights would
be an ordered sequencing analysis that would employ conceptual
partitioning between differently-ranked rights.29
This ranking would create an ordered substantive due process
interpretation of basic rights, causing our legal system to protect
lives in being from significant risks originating with rights or
interests in liberty or property. If we can employ the principle of
ranking life first, all Americans—and ultimately all of humanity—
would be better protected from the seemingly random risks30 to
statistical lives31 produced by current American legal and regulatory
systems.
We do need a way for the theory to deal with extreme cases. For
instance, when facing questions of extending a life, we cannot place
an infinite value on that life and have it override all property rights.
Consider a trillion dollars. No one can afford such a large amount of
money. The expenditure becomes extremely questionable when it

26 “Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single
metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best
characterized.” Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779, 796 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, Incommensurability].
27 Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Leo Katz, The in Rem/in Personam Distinction and
Conceptual Partitioning for Persistence, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: MAJOR WORKS,
SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al. eds.
forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3–4).
28 Id.
29 See id.
30 That which seems random, is sometimes not. Historian Peter Turchin addresses this:
“[N]onlinear interactions between various processes can produce internally driven irregular
behavior—mathematical chaos. Mathematicians have proven that a dynamical system affected
by two sources of cyclic behaviors will, under certain conditions, behave chaotically—in an
erratic manner that looks random, but in reality is completely internally generated.” PETER
TURCHIN, WAR AND PEACE AND WAR: THE RISE AND FALL OF EMPIRES 286 (2007). Turchin’s
work in cliodynamics, “the study of processes that change with time,” id. at 10, is important for
providing a new lens on history—and for warning us about the effects of processes generated
by humanity. Id. at 10–11.
31 Statistical lives, for the purposes of this Article, are lives (who have not consented to risk)
taken or significantly harmed by those risks permitted through use of the value of statistical
life (VSL) in performing cost-benefit analysis to permit risk-bearing activities. Through use of
VSL, effectively, someone buys the right to pollute and impose random statistical death, a death
which occurs years later with no traceable cause. See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra
note 9, at 201.
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prolongs one life only briefly. In extreme cases like this, whether one
life or a thousand, whether extending life for five minutes or five
years, we will need to draw the line at what is both technologically
and economically feasible. We can make these decisions using
feasible risk reduction analysis.32
Should interests in liberty outweigh the right to life? Should
property interests do the same? Life, liberty, and property are all
“rights.” How can one right count any differently from others? Let
us begin by exploring the connection between interests and rights
and the importance of those rights, especially when it comes to the
duties they impose.
I. INTERESTS AND RIGHTS
Naturally, we each have an interest in sustaining our lives. To
properly discuss how the modern American legal framework
considers this interest, we will need to graduate from considering
interests to examining rights and duties. Joseph Raz’s work in The
Morality of Freedom33 will help us make this transition.
Early in his classic statement of the interest theory of rights,34 Raz
proposes a definition of rights:
Definition: ‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and,
other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his
interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s)
to be under a duty.
Capacity for possessing rights: An individual is capable of
having rights if and only if either his well-being is of ultimate
value or he is an ‘artificial person’ (e.g. a corporation).35
I agree to Raz’s definition of rights, with one modification: life,
liberty and property are human interests. Under natural law
theory36 and international law37 these are also human rights. I

32 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 389–91 (discussing the liberty-saving benefits
of feasible risk reduction).
33 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
34 See id. at 166.
35 Id.
36 Human rights are “precepts for proper human behavior.” See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at
20. Such precepts are part of normative natural law. Id. at 20–21.
37 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights also protects the rights to life and liberty.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 72 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter
Universal Declaration]. The Protections of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights apply
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diverge from Professor Raz, however, on the following: human rights
do not accrue to artificial persons, whether artificial intelligence or
artificial creations of law.38 I do not rely solely upon Joseph Raz;
Ronald Dworkin provides additional support in Life’s Dominion.39
If we are clear about our interests, we will have a clearer view of
our essential rights, we need to recognize a hierarchy of human
interests.
A. A Hierarchy of Interests
All humans have interests in life, liberty, and property. If we
prioritize these interests, the corresponding rights will make more
sense. Considering lexical priority would create a hierarchy where
interests in life come first.
Why rank our interests in life first, ahead of liberty and property?
Many liberty rights such as speech, religion, privacy, and press are
currently considered fundamental rights.40 And, unlimited property
rights are of great appeal to libertarians.41 However, without life, the
individual has nothing. Extended to the group, the group has
nothing. Extended to the largest group, there can be no liberty or
property, as there would be no one to have a liberty interest, property
interest, or any interest whatsoever. What is more, loss of life is
irreversible. Life must be our first and greatest interest,42 above
liberty, property, or any other interest.
If we rank interests in life first, both individual and group life

to all of us. There is a “litany of universal terms reflect[ing] the drafters’ conviction that there
are no exceptions to the possession of human rights. All members of the human family possess
them simply by virtue of that membership.”
JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFTING AND INTENT 129 (1999). We are one,
legally.
38 Rights of life and liberty should not accrue to property interests or instruments,
individually or in groups, no matter the size. This is an example of masquerading rights. See
infra Part II.B, for a discussion of masquerading rights. But see ADAM WINKLER, WE THE
CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 255 (2018).
39 See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 16 (1993).
40 Fundamental rights in U.S. constitutional law are currently considered a sub-class of
liberty rights. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.5, at 848 (5th ed. 2012). Fundamental rights are subject to
the special protection of heightened scrutiny by the courts. Id.
41 See Stephen O’Hanlon, Justice Kennedy’s Short-Lived Libertarian Revolution: A Brief
History of the Supreme Court Libertarian Ideology, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1, 17
(2008).
42 “[T]he life of a human organism has intrinsic value in any form it takes, even in the
extremely undeveloped form of a very early, just-implanted embryo.” DWORKIN, supra note 39,
at 69.
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considerations (e.g., health) would be of ultimate value. When
conflicts between life interests arise, then, we are weighing life
against life (or health)—commensurable variables. The decisions
may not be easy, but they are possible because they consider similar
or like variables. If the question is a ninety-percent chance of the loss
of ten lives versus a fifty-percent chance of the loss of a thousand,
these comparable risks may be weighed to arrive at a justifiable
decision. At the greatest level, all humans are in the risk pool and
have an interest in this inquiry.
We all have a mutuality of interest in reducing risks to life. The
mutuality of those interests justifies the creation of systems to
analyze significant risks43 to life and health and to prescribe and
implement adjustments to address them. The most important
interests deserve the best systems. We need law to protect our
collective interest in life and health first, or we will fail in our greatest
individual, collective, and mutual interests.
Our interests in life must include matters of health. The quality,
and even existence, of our lives is premised on our health.44 Our
interests in health and life align with our duties. We do not have a
duty to provide good health to people, but we do have a duty not to
risk significant harm to peoples’ health.45
Although we have an interest in our health, we often do not want
to compromise our liberty. Some of us have bad habits, like smoking,
that might be banned. Must we give up all bungie-jumping liberties
to protect our health? When the law substantially reduces liberties,
life becomes oppressive.46 There are unintended consequences.47
However, in the ranking, relevant liberties are not individual
activities such as those performed on a high wire, with a cigarette, or
with a shot glass. They are broad categories writ large, e.g.,
association, voting, travel, speech, religion, press, privacy, and
fairness in criminal procedures and due process claims—our
fundamental liberty interests.48
See infra Part VII.A.
We should favor respect (protection) over repair after the fact. See Gregory C. Keating,
The Priority of Respect Over Repair, 18 LEGAL THEORY 293, 318 (2012).
45 See id. at 313.
46 See Tom Stacy, Controversial Decisions of the 1994-95 Supreme Court Term: Does
Federalism Promote Liberty?, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 18 (1996).
47 Consider, for example, the oppression of alcohol prohibition and the consequent rise of
Italian organized crime. See JOHN J. BINDER, AL CAPONE’S BEER WARS: A COMPLETE HISTORY
OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN CHICAGO DURING PROHIBITION 65–66 (2017); Nora V. Demleitner,
Organized Crime and Prohibition: What Difference Does Legalization Make?, 15 WHITTIER L.
REV. 613, 622–23 (1994).
48 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th ed.), supra note 4, § 11.8, at 502–03.
43
44
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Our property interests are in things: physical things, electronic
credits,49 or, if one considers intellectual property interests, mere
expressions or embodiments of ideas in which we claim an ownership
or control interest.50 Property interests can be subject to significant
risk, but can also bear significant risk to life, health, or liberty
interests.51 We will look at conflicting situations shortly.52
First, however, we need to move from interests to the justification
of rights, and then on to the relationship of rights and duties. Once
we have established rights, at the intersection of our interests and
duties, we will turn to the matter of conflicting rights.
B. Interests Warrant Rights
Interests provide the normative foundations for rights.53 Our
interests can be many. Our liberty supports a wide array of interests.
Some of those interests have created well-developed norms,54 many
of them reciprocal, in our socio-politico-economic system.55 Some
interests have proven to be so important in human history and in
natural law that they are considered both basic and salient enough
to require special protection from governmental action.56 Those
interests not only warrant rights, they merit special constitutional
protection, as expressed in our Bill of Rights, bestowed on each living
person in the United States.57
1. Interests Can Justify Rights
Although interests can justify rights, interests do not necessarily
create rights. The interest58 is merely a necessary condition or pre-

49 Consider Bitcoin, electronic shares of stock, or other electronic assets. See Peter Chawaga,
Making the Case for Bitcoin as Legal Property, BITCOIN MAG. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://bitcoinmag
azine.com/articles/making-case-bitcoin-legal-property/.
50 See Gene Quinn, Protecting Ideas: Can Ideas Be Protected or Patented?, IPWATCHDOG
(Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/02/15/protecting-ideas-can-ideas-be-protecte
d-or-patented/id=48009/.
51 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 390–91.
52 See infra Part II.B.
53 See Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law
Scholarship, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 468–69 (2003).
54 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 347 (1997).
55 See id. at 345, 383.
56 See RAZ, supra note 33, at 256–57.
57 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting fundamental rights, such as the freedom of
religion, speech, and press from governmental action).
58 See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 15–19 (discussing interests).
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qualification.59
If our interests are sufficient, coextensive, and reciprocal, by
recognizing those interests, you and I could together create rights
with duties to each other. To qualify as sufficient, the interest needs
to figure essentially in the right. According to Joseph Raz, “[a] right
is based on the interest which figures essentially in the justification
of the statement that the right exists.”60
Now consider the role of duties: a right is not created until a duty
is imposed.61 Duties protect corresponding rights.62 Rights require
more than interests and duties:63 one must also have a capacity to
have rights.64 The definition of rights requires “that right-holders are
creatures who have interests.”65 Humanity is required.66
What are the conditions for the capacity to have these human
rights? The “reciprocity thesis” applies to members of the same moral
community.67 One gets the benefit of the rights if one accepts the
duties.68 A moral community should extend to any human subject to
its duties.
Rights can go a long way, but some interests may be unprotected.
Why are some of people’s interests not protected by rights? Joseph
Raz responds:
Rights protect not their interests generally but only their
interest in freedom. The capacity to be free, to decide freely
the course of their own lives, is what makes a person.
Respecting people as people consists in giving due weight to
their interest in having and exercising that capacity. On this
view respect for people consists in respecting their interest to
enjoy personal autonomy.69

See id. 16, 17 (describing how interests can be a condition or pre-qualification).
See RAZ, supra note 33, at 169.
61 See id. at 166.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 176. Even Raz himself nearly dismisses “‘artificial’ persons” from the having the
capacity to have rights until he seems to catch himself. See id.
66 The ape who took a photo of himself did not have the capacity to have ownership rights in
that photo. See Camila Domonoske, Monkey Can’t Own Copyright to His Selfie, Federal Judge
Says, NPR (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/07/462245189/fede
ral-judge-says-monkey-cant-own-copyright-to-his-selfie.
67 RAZ, supra note 33, at 176.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 190.
59
60
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Although important, that autonomy has limits that come as duties.70
We will consider the limits of duties and rights, and the mechanisms
to protect liberty and property interests.
If we consider duties imposed and rights granted by the U.S.
Constitution, they can apply individually or collectively to any group
in our community of interest, the United States of America, at least
most any group with standing to sue. Most of those duties to others
are already in place in our law.71
Everyone is entitled to respect,72 especially when right-holders
possess the power and the opportunity to inflict harm to our vital
interests. Professor Raz explains respect: “[r]especting a person
consists in giving appropriate weight to his interest. The interest in
being respected is but an element of the interest one has in one’s
interest. If respecting people is giving proper weight to their
interests, then clearly we respect people by respecting their rights.”73
The contour of their interests exceeds that of their rights.74 At a
minimum, under the law, we respect others and their interests by
recognizing their rights and our duties pertaining thereto.
2. Interests Can Justify Institutions
Sometimes the recognition of interests requires systemic change.75
And, sometimes that change requires the creation of a new system or
new institution.76 Interests can justify sufficient duties to support
the creation of institutions or systems in support of the rights they
ground or create.77
Groupings of duties can result in the building of institutions.78 In
governmental institutions “it may be proper to say that rights are
grounds not so much for judging that certain duties exist as for
imposing them.”79 Thus, the interests that support institutions such
as Medicare (which supports life and health) can support and create
70 See id. at 176 (explaining that people exercising rights derived from a community are still
subject to obligations to other members of that community).
71 See, e.g., id. at 256 (mentioning several fundamental duties to others enforced by the law).
72 In a sense, I equate respect with equal protection under the law.
73 RAZ, supra note 33, at 188.
74 Some interests may not be rights (imposed as claims on others) but instead are privileges
(discretion or liberty), a Hohfeldian distinction. See Leif Wenar, The Nature of Rights, 33 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 223, 226, 229 (2005).
75 See RAZ, supra note 33, at 171.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 172.
78 See id. (discussing how the grounds for new duties can result in the building of appropriate
institutions).
79 Id.
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new duties and their corresponding rights.80
3. A Hierarchy of Interests Justifies a Hierarchy of Rights
If some of our interests must rise above others in order to protect
the ones we deem most important, the same hierarchy would apply
to rights as a logical extension. A hierarchy of rights is called for. If
we do not protect with superior rights and duties our most important
interests, those interests will receive inadequate protection in
encounters with other rights.81
Consistent with our prime interest in not having our lives taken
individually or collectively,82 the right to life is, and should be, our
prime right. The value of ranking rights is that it protects best the
interests we hold most dear, our interests in life and health.83
Ranking would also help our legal system function in a more logical,
approachable (understandable to the layman), and just manner.
C. Rights and Duties
Rights are valuable not only for how they help rights holders, but
for the duties those rights impose on all.84 Rights are meaningless
without appropriate recognition and response. As Joseph Raz puts
it, “[r]ights ground requirements for action in the interest of other
beings,”85 even if having those rights happens to be against an
individual’s own interests.86
When the drafters of the U.S. Restatements of the common law at
the American Law Institute described rights, the rights, excepting

80
81
82

See id.
See id. at 256–57.
Professor Dworkin addresses the greatest collective aspect:

Our concern for the preservation of animal species reaches its most dramatic and intense
form, of course, in the case of one particular species: our own. It is an inarticulate,
unchallenged, almost unnoticed, but nevertheless absolute premise of our political and
economic planning that the human race must survive and prosper.
DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 76.
83 See RAZ, supra note 33, at 262 (asserting that fundamental rights deserve special
protection and recognition).
84 See RAZ, supra note 33, at 180.
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., id. (“A person may have property which is more trouble than it is worth.”).
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the law of torts,87 were correlative with duties.88 According to the
Restatement (First) of Property, every right carries with it a
corresponding, reciprocal, or correlative duty:
The relation indicated by the word “right” may also be stated
from the point of view of the person against whom that right
exists. This person has a duty, that is, is under a legally
enforceable obligation to do or not to do an act. The word
“duty” is used in this Restatement with this meaning.89
The Restatement (First) of Property was created in 1936, and a
substantial amount of legal and philosophical theory has been
explored since then.90 Whether one creates a duty or a right first,
American law has long taken the position that rights, such as those
provided by our Bill of Rights, create correlative duties.91
Conflicting interests and their resulting duties may intervene to
limit those rights. “[Rights] justify . . . a view [that others have
duties] only to the extent that there are no conflicting considerations
of greater weight.”92 Others’ lives present a potentially conflicting
consideration of the greatest weight. Thus, duties may not seem
straightforward.
Rights and the duties they ground cannot be infinite. Duties may
not provide sufficient support to achieve the aim of the corresponding
rights.93 Hence, the limits of others’ duties can be problematic for
rights holders.

87 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: RIGHT § 1 cmt. a, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1936) (“In
restating the law of Torts, it has been found necessary to use the word ‘duty’ as a word denoting
‘the fact that an actor is required to conduct himself in a particular manner at the risk that if
he does not do so he may become liable to another to whom the duty is owed . . . .’”).
88 Id. § 1 cmt. a.
89 Id. The coupling of rights and duties developed from Kant’s notion of universal law that
applies to all. Edward J. Eberle, The German Idea of Freedom, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 1, 35–36
(2008).
90 See, e.g., Rex Martin & James W. Nickel, Recent Work on the Concept of Rights, 17 AM.
PHIL. Q. 165, 165–67 (1980) (surveying the debate over whether rights are always correlated
with obligations).
91 See id. at 167.
92 RAZ, supra note 33, at 172.
93 Raz explains:

Many rights ground duties which fall short of securing their object, and they may ground
many duties not one. A right to personal security does not require others to protect a
person from all accident or injury. The right is, however, the foundation of several duties,
such as the duty not to assault, rape or imprison the right-holder.
Id. at 170–71.
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Duties are not rigid and immutable. As Raz observes, “[t]he duties
grounded in a right may be conditional.”94 Even duties pertaining to
the right to life may be conditional.95
Lives may not be taken except to save other lives—e.g. self-defense
is permitted.96 Otherwise, not risking the lives and health of others
is, and should be, a common duty for the common good.
The duty not to kill is grounded by the right to life.97 That right is
held by individuals and by groups of individuals; the duties extend
correspondingly to individuals and groups.98 No one should be
exempt from the duties or the rights.99
We need new duties in American law to better protect life. More
effective judicial protection of the right to life, or through the creation
of institutions (e.g. regulatory) with the purpose of protecting this
right could achieve this goal.100 Because the right to life depends on
the existence of a habitable environment,101 protecting this right
must also include protection of the life support system of Planet
Earth.
This analysis and the resulting proposals center on the right to life:
if you have a right to survive, I then have a duty not to interfere.
Whether you look at it from the perspective of the right or the duty,
the right should be recognized as a “prime directive”102 individually
and collectively. Our Constitution should treat life as such.
However, this Due Process right is already limited by the duties it
imposes.103 The rights—that life, liberty, and property shall not be
taken without due process of law—are already spelled out twice in
the U.S. Constitution.104 But the duties that arise from those rights
are limited to federal, state, and local governmental entities.105
Id. at 167.
See Douglas Husak, Comparative Fault in Criminal Law: Conceptual and Normative
Perplexities, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 523, 527 (2005).
96 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
97 RAZ, supra note 33, at 183.
98 See Martin & Nickel, supra note 90, at 177–78.
99 Human rights apply to everyone. See MORSINK, supra note 37, at 129.
100 See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification,
56 VAND. L. REV. 653, 686–87 (2003).
101 See Eva H. Hanks & John L. Hanks, The Right to a Habitable Environment, in THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE—WHAT THEY SHOULD BE 158 (Norman Dorsen ed.,
1971).
102 The term “Prime Directive,” as spoken by Starship Captain Jean Luc Picard in the
television series Star Trek: Next Generation, pertained to not disturbing the cultural
development of less-developed cultures encountered on other planets. It would be beneficial to
first explicitly redefine that term—in favor of the protection of life.
103 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 33, at 183.
104 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
105 See United States v. Stanley (The Civil Rights Cases), 109 U.S. 3, 10–11 (1883); The
94
95
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Otherwise, our duties are grounded by other sources of rights.106
At the extreme ends of the spectrum (e.g., extreme amounts of
money or extreme loss of liberty), lines blur and rights may conflict.
Duties cannot be infinite. In such cases, significant risks to life, first,
and liberty or property, second, should be reduced to the extent
technologically and economically feasible.
1. Other Justifications for Rights
Joseph Raz provides only one of the many justifications for
rights.107 By requiring a duty, Raz seems to provide a narrow
justification of what counts as a right.108 The rights to life, liberty,
and property are so important that there is no doubt that they fit
Raz’s definition of rights.109 Each of these rights ground many duties.
Analysis based on duties may be more useful for the protection of life
and liberty than theories of right based on will,110 any-incident,111 or
several functions.112 According to the U.S. Constitution, no matter
the philosophical theory, these rights are entitled to due process of
law.113

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80–81 (1873).
106 See JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN, JUSTICE, LAW AND CULTURE 72 (1985). Examples of other
sources of rights are: homicide laws, laws against theft, and tort laws. See ROBERT STEVENS,
TORTS AND RIGHTS 2–3 (2007); see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 2018) (describing
the purpose of New York’s penal code as proscribing conduct—i.e. imposing a duty to act in
permissible ways—to ensure public safety).
107 See RAZ, supra note 33, at 172.
108 See id. at 172, 180.
109 See id. at 166, 180; Marshall J. Ray, What Does the Natural Rights Clause Mean to New
Mexico?, 39 N.M. L. REV. 375, 399 n.156 (2009).
110 “The will theory of rights asserts that the single function of a right is to give the
rightholder discretion over the duty of another.” Wenar, supra note 74, at 238. The protection
of life is not about discretion. We protect the sacred with duties. There should be very little
discretion over those duties. Even the rightholder’s discretion may be limited.
111 “The any-incident theory simply says that any Hohfeldian incident [((1) privilege, (2)
claim, (3) power, and (4) immunity)] or complex of incidents is a right.” Id. at 225, 244. It is
important that we properly categorize and differentiate rights. The protection of life will focus
largely on the claim. We don’t need to rely on Hohfeldian incidents, especially the third and
fourth incidents (power and immunity), to establish sufficient interests and duties to support
a right to life. See id. at 244. Some Hohfeldian analysis may be unnecessary here. We will,
however, find that Hohfeldian differentiation is essential to the operation of ranking rights.
See, e.g., Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1163 (1938).
112 “The several functions theory holds that any incident or combination of incidents is a
right, but only . . . so long as they mark exemption, discretion, or authorization, or entitle their
holders to protection, provision, or performance.” Wenar, supra note 74, at 246. Certainly,
protection of life and health is the issue here. The theory says that “there is no one function
that all rights have.” Id. at 248. I would respond by claiming that all rights should function to
support (not interfere with) life.
113 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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2. The Duties for a Right to Life
“[T]he duty to give due weight to the interests of persons . . . is
grounded on the intrinsic desirability of the well-being of persons.”114
Since life and health are crucial elements of a person’s well-being, it
follows that the weight given to life and health interests should be
the greatest.115 Our norms,116 our morality,117 and our laws118 all
place greatest weight on protecting life.119 Where our laws and
regulations soften on the position of protecting rights is with property
interests.120
Imbuing rights with special significance, especially through
governmental protection, bolsters their salience, even in private
transactions.121 Protecting these rights through due process of law
ensures their importance in everyday life and allows us to effectively
protect that most fundamental right—the right to life.

RAZ, supra note 33, at 190.
See, e.g., Melissa Moschella, Natural Law, Parental Rights and Education Policy, 59 AM.
J. JURIS. 197, 198 (2014).
116 Consider the wonderful, and often dangerous, life-saving work of first responders. See
Chau Lam, 9/11 First Responders Face Illness, Uncertain Future, NEWSDAY (Sept. 10, 2017),
https://www.newsday.com/news/health/9-11-first-responders-face-illness-uncertain-future1.14126397.
117 Judeo-Christian morality is reflected in the moral law of the Ten Commandments. The
Fifth Commandment states: “Thou shalt not kill.” Deuteronomy 5:17; Exodus 20:13. Other
religions have similar prohibitions. “In Jainism, and among some Buddhists, Hindus, and
Taoists, the concept of absolute nonviolence (ahimsa) encompasses all animals and living
beings.” Murder, WORLD SCRIPTURE, https://www.unification.net/ws/theme060.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2018).
118 Statutes and case law ban homicide. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1112 (2012); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2018); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2501–2504 (2018); People v. Boutin, 555
N.E.2d 253, 254–55 (N.Y. 1990) (quoting People v. Haney, 284 N.E.2d 564, 567 (N.Y. 1972));
Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 796–97 (Pa. 2015).
119 “[O]ur rights against harm depend on what we can reasonably demand of others.”
Jonathan Quong & Helen Frowe, The Morality of Defensive Harm (pt. I), 89 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 249, 249 (Supp. 2015). Moral rights may be different from legal rights.
Quong’s article is about moral rights. See id. But the harm under consideration in this article
is the ultimate harm, loss of life, which invokes law. Under the law, we have rights against
harm, especially significant risk of loss of life. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111–1112; N.Y. PENAL §125.00;
tit. 18, §§ 2501–2504; Boutin, 555 N.E.2d at 254–55 (quoting Haney, 284 N.E.2d at 567). The
law demands of others that they may not take a life or lives (especially of the innocent or
unconsenting). See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a); PA. tit. 18, § 2504(b); Boutin, 555 N.E.2d at 245–55
(quoting Haney, 284 N.E.2d at 567). Therefore, our law should protect both the innocent and
the unconsenting. These duties align with both law and morality.
120 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 555
(1997) (“There nonetheless remains a significant area of contemporary constitutional law in
which property interests have not enjoyed equal treatment with liberty interests.”).
121 See RAZ, supra note at 256–57.
114
115
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II. SHAPING AND DEFINING A RIGHT TO LIFE
Where is life in the hierarchy of interests? Is it of value in
achieving other goals? Or is it an end in itself? Western religion122
and law123 treat life as being of ultimate value, sacred value, and an
end, in and of itself.124 Raz discusses ultimate value:
Being of ultimate, i.e. non-derivative, value is being
intrinsically valuable, i.e. being valuable independently of
one’s instrumental value. Something is instrumentally
valuable to the extent that it derives its value from the value
of its consequences, or from the value of the consequences it is
likely to have, or from the value of the consequences it can be
used to produce. Having intrinsic value is being valuable even
apart from one’s instrumental value. But not everything
which is intrinsically valuable is also of ultimate value.125
Life is both intrinsically valuable and sacred.126 Because life has
no substitute, and the loss of life is irreversible, life is the most
precious right.127 When ranking rights, life is of ultimate value.
Although duties that save lives are beneficial,128 Raz recognizes
that the duty only goes so far: “[t]he right to life may impose a duty
not to kill or endanger the life of another without imposing a duty to
take whatever action is necessary to keep him alive.”129 Without a
system (like Medicare) in place to support the interests and their
rights, and to create duties relating thereto, there is no right to
medical care.
What counts as life? All human lives in being qualify.130 If you are
living and breathing, your interest in continuing is presumed. You

See, e.g., Deuteronomy, supra note 117; Exodus, supra note 117.
Statutes in all 50 states ban murder. See U.S. v. Marrero, 677 F.3d 155, 166 n.2 (3d Cir.
2012) (“All fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize intentional or premeditated
murder, and forty-four states and the District of Columbia define a felony murder offense.”).
124 See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 85, 92.
125 RAZ, supra note 33, at 177.
126 See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 73–74. Life is not valuable as in “money” but, instead,
life is valuable as in “precious.” See id. at 71.
127 See id. at 82.
128 Cf. Brian McCall, Why It Is Good to Stop at a Red Light: The Basis of Authority and
Obligation, 55 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 83, 125 (2016) (“[L]aws are needed both to urge people to
virtue by directing to the good they can will themselves and to compel others, ‘for most people
obey necessity rather than argument.’”).
129 RAZ, supra note 33, at 183.
130 See Universal Declaration, supra note 37, at art. 3.
122
123
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have a right to that life. I would want you to do the same for me.
That is the reciprocal nature of our rights.
Our inquiry into the shape and definition of the right to life
continues as we explore what qualifies as the right to life. Then, we
examine conflicts with other rights.
A. Qualifying the Right to Life
Life should be construed broadly enough that each of us does not
find ourselves unprotected by this basic right. Internationally, the
right to life is a human right applying to all human lives in being.131
As this article pertains to the U.S. Constitution, the lives that are
subject to protection here are American lives.132 Therefore, we must
narrow our inquiry to consider the protection of American lives, but
in doing so, we must honor the rights of all lives in being worldwide
or we risk violation of international law.133
To protect life, we must separate life from potential life.134
Potential life should not be allowed to displace or harm lives in being.
The rights of the unborn must not displace the rights of the living.135
The issue of abortion is often viewed as constituting a conflict
between the liberty right of the mother and the life right of the
fetus.136 If the matter were so simple, Roe v. Wade would have been
overturned.137 However, the issue of abortion is much more
complicated with considerations of the physical and mental health of
the mother as well as the well-being of the fetus, should it come into
the (sometimes very unstable or dangerous) world of its mother.138
We must recognize that the qualitative aspects of life can be defeated
by the quantitative aspect. We must also recognize that the decision

See id.
See generally Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. L. REV. 499,
528 (2014) (the U.S. government typically values foreign lives at zero).
133 See id. at 509.
134 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
135 See id. at 162, 164.
136 See id. at 153.
137 Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992) (“After considering the
fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional integrity, and
the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should
be retained and once again reaffirmed.”).
138 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973); cf. Jennifer M.
Granholm, Republicans: What About Children Outside the Womb?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6.
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jennifer-m-granholm/republicans-what-about-ch_b_18
35134.html (“I think in many cases, your morality is deeply lacking if all you want is a child
born but not a child fed, not a child educated, not a child housed.”).
131
132
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to abort is difficult enough without the need to do so illegally.139
Abortion is traumatic.140 It should be rare but legal.
Our rights are not frozen. Each of us can contract away our
property and some limited liberty,141 but we cannot contract away our
lives.142 Prior consent to known and fully disclosed risk represents
an exception.143 Each of us has the autonomy to contract to accept
certain additional risks to our lives in return for additional
compensation.144
What else qualifies for protection? Does one’s health qualify for
protection? What about statistical lives? Does the protection of the
right to life mean the end of the death penalty?
Significant risks to health require protection.145 Health is different
and distinct from life itself,146 but both should be protected for the
sake of bodily integrity.147 Foreseeable health risks should be
included with life, provided: (1) that risks to health are significant;
(2) to add significant quality or length of life; and (3) that prevention
is both technologically and economically feasible.
Statistical lives come in at least two categories: lives in being and
future lives.148 Statistical lives in being should be protected, as those
lives are individuals with rights currently in this country and on this
planet.149 The protection of future statistical lives seems more
See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 916 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id.
141 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 33, at 180. An example of a liberty that could be contracted
away would be privacy, an inverse liberty. See, e.g., Jacob Morgan, Privacy Is Completely and
Utterly Dead, and We Killed It, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2014, 12:04 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/jacobmorgan/2014/08/19/privacy-is-completely-and-utterly-dead-and-we-killedit/#3a4c66f631a7.
142 See Universal Declaration, supra note 37, at art. 3.
143 See, e.g., Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion DecisionMaking, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 226 (2009).
144 See, e.g., id.
145 See, e.g., Act Against AIDS, U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/actagainstaids/basics/prevention.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (“If you
are living with HIV, there are many actions you can take to prevent passing it to others.”).
146 Compare Health, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The state of being alive as
a human; an individual person’s existence.); with Life, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“The relative quality, state, or condition of one’s physical or mental well-being, whether good
or bad.”).
147 See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
148 See, e.g., James K. Hammit & Nicolas Treich, Statistical vs. Identified Lives in BenefitCost Analysis, 35 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 45, 46 (2007) (“The economic literature on the ‘value
of life’ has, from the beginning, clearly distinguished between identified and statistical
lives . . . . The focus on statistical rather than identified lives is consistent with the traditional
marginal approach to the valuation of public goods and lessens the scope for psychological
concerns in the usual case where the effects of a policy on individual mortality risks are small.”)
(citations omitted).
149 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV; Universal Declaration, supra note 37, at art. 3.
139
140
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difficult. No one wants to give up present benefits for an unknown
future—until it comes to protecting one’s own descendants.150 But, if
we look at the issue of statistical lives as including the future of all
known life, and the health of the life support system of this planet,
the duties become clearer. We have a duty to the species (including
our own)151 that got us here to reciprocate and allow them a future.
What about the death penalty? Who has the right to kill people?
Certainly not murderers. However, under the common law, those
who engage in self-defense have a valid defense as do those in some
jurisdictions who attempt to save a life under the doctrine of
necessity.152
The death penalty is the taking of life by the State.153 The Due
Process Clauses require that there be no such taking without due
process of law.154 What process is due? We have an array of case law
on the process due for the administration of the death penalty.155 The
revelations of The Innocence Project156 are troubling here. Errors
occur with surprising frequency.157 And one error is too many. At
some point, we should outgrow the death penalty.
If we do not protect all incipient human life, how can we protect

150 Cf. Vaccines for Your Children: Protect Your Child at Every Age, CDC (Apr. 15, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/parents/protecting-children/index.html (“Vaccination is one of
the best ways parents can protect infants, children, and teens from 16 potentially harmful
diseases.”).
151 See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 76. “Our concern for future generations is not a matter
of justice at all but of our instinctive sense that human flourishing as well as human survival
is of sacred importance.” Id. at 78.
152 See Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Application of Defense of Necessity to Murder, 23 A.L.R.
7th Art. 1 (2018); A. M. Swarthout, Annotation, Danger or Apparent Danger of Death or Great
Bodily Harm as Condition of Self-Defense in Prosecution for Assault as Distinguished from
Prosecution for Homicide, 114 A.L.R. 634 (1938).
153 See Capital Punishment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Death Penalty, id.
154 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
155 See, e.g., Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016) (“The Sixth Amendment requires a
jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s mere
recommendation is not enough.”); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899, 1905 (“The Court
now holds that under the Due Process Clause there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when
a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in [seeking the death
penalty in] defendant’s case.”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619 (2002) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment requires individual jurors to make, and to take responsibility for, a decision to
sentence a person to death.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (“[T]he
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of
the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the
penalty of death.”).
156 See About, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/about (last
visited Oct. 13, 2018).
157 See Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are
Sentenced to Death, 111 PNAS 7230, 7231 (2014).
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future statistical lives? Future lives cannot be our focus either, or we
risk losing sight of a commitment to protect all (American, at least)
lives in being.
Focusing on risks to the human species is different. The goal is to
protect the health and lives in being of the entire species, including
all Americans. Significant risks to the entire species put Americans
at risk, and those risks to American rights to life merit treatment in
American law.
B. Conflicts with Other Rights
Rights do not exist in a vacuum. With social change, active
societies will see underlying norms, interests, and even duties
change.158 As a result, rights can change in relation to other rights
and create conflicts. Such change can happen structurally, or even
merely as result of profit maximization in everyday commerce.159
There is no doubt that potential conflicts are plentiful and that the
issues between liberty and property interests are of sufficient
importance and complexity to merit and require resolution
elsewhere.
Rights can conflict as a consequence of choice.160 You live
downstream from me. My decision to pollute may conflict with your
rights to life, health, clean water, and a healthy environment.
However, if the protection of your health means that all polluting
activity must cease, massive loss of employment with resulting
economic and social harm would result. Life and health interests
cannot automatically trump all risks posed by liberty and property
interests.161 We would lose our liberty and become unable to engage

158 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 383 (1997) (“[T]he more concrete the norm is, the more likely it will change as
conditions change.”).
159 For example, Gregory Keating shows that some commercial transactions (with extreme
market power, self-interest, or maximization) can bring rights into conflict:

Consider liberty and property. On plenty of conceptions—e.g., Locke’s—people should
be free to acquire property by exercising their labor and their liberty. But this can set
up conflicts with other people’s rights to life (e.g., by permitting someone to acquire a
monopoly over something necessary) and other people’s liberty (e.g., by accumulating so
much that other people are destitute and their freedom is worth very little).
E-mail from Gregory C. Keating, William T. Dalessi Professor of Law and Philosophy, Univ. of
S. Cal. Law Sch., to author (Aug. 14, 2017, 20:44 PDT) (on file with author).
160 See Keating, supra note 100, at 677.
161 See id. at 676 (“If we cannot put others at peril[,] . . . we cannot act and so cannot pursue
our ends and lead our lives. Maximal security extinguishes liberty . . . .”).
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in much everyday activity.
The right to life cannot be allowed to ban all risk-producing
activity.162 Professor Raz recognizes that such duties must be
limited:
[T]he fact that rights are sufficient to ground duties limits the
rights one has. Only where one’s interest is a reason for
another to behave in a way which protects or promotes it, and
only when this reason has the peremptory character of a duty,
and, finally, only when the duty is for conduct which makes a
significant difference for the promotion or protection of that
interest does the interest give rise to a right.163
We can apply Raz’s rule or principle to conflicts between liberty
and life or health. My liberty shall be undisturbed unless and until
my actions represent a significant risk to your life or health. Now we
have a way to maximize liberty without posing a significant risk to
life or health. The same can be done when property rights might pose
significant risks to life or health.
The rights and the duties they ground should apply only when
there is a significant risk to life or health. These are the same risks
we looked at in A Hierarchy of Interests164 and will discuss in greater
depth below.165
Of all the activities that bear significant risk, some can be
abandoned, while others we cannot live without.166 These categories
of activities fit within the safety and feasibility standards,
respectively.167 The significance requirement allows the protection of
life and health without eradicating rights in liberty or property.168
Thus, liberty and property rights exist and operate until they
encounter the point of significant risk to life or health.169 A
conceptual partition between life (and health) and liberty or property
enables the cooperation of multiple rights of different

See id.
RAZ, supra note 33, at 183.
164 See supra Part I(A); Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 391.
165 See infra Part VII(A).
166 See Keating, supra note 100, at 662.
167 See id. at 657–58.
168 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 340.
169 Cf. id. (“Once risks to life and health are reduced to the point of insignificance, they may
be replaced by considerations of liberty and possibly even by considerations of property—until
the point where risk becomes significant again.”).
162
163
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commensurabilities.170
When do we decide to abandon certain risky activities? If the safe
level of risk imposition is to be employed, the banned activity must
be one that we all agree to live without. Otherwise, with feasible risk
reduction, the activity is abandoned only where reduction of
foreseeable significant risks is both technologically and economically
feasible.171
The protection of some rights can affect the scope of conflicting
rights.172 According to Raz, “[r]ights can conflict with other rights or
with other duties, but if the conflicting considerations defeat the right
they cannot be necessarily coextensive in their scope.”173 Thus, my
right to liberty is not coextensive with your right to life and health.
My liberty right is bounded by the significant risks I pose to the life
and health of others.
The same goes for my rights in property. My property rights must
defer to others’ rights to life and health. To claim that liberty with
property should be unlimited ignores any significant risks to the lives
and health of others.
We need to be able to clearly classify rights if we are going to rank
them. The unlimited liberty with property claimed by libertarians is
an example of masquerading rights.174 A right to property can be
presented as the implication of a right to liberty or even a right to
life.175 If we can clearly see interests for what they are, and then
separate the distinct rights, we can prioritize one ahead of another.

170 Cf. id. at 339 (“Safety is considered exclusively. For significant risks, it is the only
consideration because the costs on the other side are not at all commensurable with the life and
health safety protects. Life and health are not fungible at some ratio of exchange with liberty
or with property.”).
171 See Keating, supra note 100, at 692–93.
172 See RAZ, supra note 33, at 184.
173 Id.
174 See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth
Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 687, 708 n. 72 (1999).
175 Two intersections of property and life come to mind. First, the value of statistical life in
cost-benefit analysis places a dollar value on human lives and effectively turns those lives into
property interests. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 61 (“How much is
one human life worth? According to the Environmental Protection Agency, $ 6.1 million.”).
Secondly, corporations are collections of property interests with profit as the primary interest.
See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”); 12 OHIO JUR. 3d
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 542 (2018) (“Shares of stock . . . constitute a property interest [in
the corporation].”). For-profit enterprises are not worthy of human rights. For one thing, they
no longer have lifespans. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(1) (McKinney 2018) (“Each
corporation . . . shall have power . . . to have perpetual duration.”) (emphasis added). “[U]ntil
1875 . . . , the duration of corporate franchises was generally limited to a period of 20, 30, or 50
years.” Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 555 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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No amount of liberty with property should be allowed to change its
classification into liberty or life.
Property is an enumerated right in the Constitution.176 Its lexical
priority follows and ranks below life.177 Property rights must yield to
life, health, and even some liberties.
Liberty needs to encounter and yield to life and health as well.
Those with rights to life and health—all of us—need others to have
duties to recognize and respect those rights. Those duties must limit
liberty, otherwise life and health would suffer.
Under the Supreme Court’s current definition, fundamental rights
are considered merely a subset of liberty rights.178 John Nowak and
Ronald Rotunda identify this usage of the term as a misnomer, and
instead suggest that “this concept would have been easier to
understand if the Court called these rights ‘fundamental
constitutional liberties.’”179 Life should be considered a fundamental
right as well. But fundamental rights are not enough. The Due
Process ranking also includes property.180 Therefore, I will instead
refer to life, liberty, and property as the ranking of basic rights.181
The importance of liberty in the ranking is that it comes after life,
not before.182 We are not going to worry about protecting liberties
until we assess and address risks to life and health. Liberties then,
in the absence of feasible risk reduction, stop at the point at which
risk becomes significant.183
Life, liberty, and property are all basic rights. They ground the
governmental duties embedded in Due Process of Law.184 Life is a
non-derivative human right.185 Life is not grounded in other rights.186
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). See also
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 43 (1971) (Rawls provides an example of the use of lexical
priority, although it is merely with different types of liberty).
178 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 40, § 15.5, at 848.
179 Id.
180 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
181 I have referred to this ranking elsewhere as the “ranking of fundamental rights.” Draper,
Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 237; Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 313 n.50,
380 n.280, 391. To reduce confusion with fundamental rights (the Court’s name for
fundamental liberties), I now refer to the ranking as the ranking of basic rights.
182 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
183 See Keating, supra note 100, at 676.
184 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 33, at 167.
185 See, e.g., id. at 168.
186 See id. (“Just as rights are grounds for duties and powers so they can be for other
rights. . . . [A] right which is grounded in another right [is] a derivative right. Non-derivative
rights are core rights.”).
176
177
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Without life, there can be no grounding of other rights.187 Life is
essential and sacred. The ultimate core right—life—is the most
fundamental or basic right.
Life stands out as being different. As Joseph Raz points out,
“[s]ome rights may be absolute.”188 If any right could be absolute, it
would be the right to life. Thus, in conflicts with rights to liberty or
property, the presence of significant risks to life and health requires
recognition of both the ranking of rights and the primacy of the right
to life.
III. ORIGIN OF RANKING BASIC RIGHTS
Consistent with the above hierarchy of interests, rights, and duties,
one moral theory—which I now refer to as the ranking of basic
rights—is a structured principle found in Late Scholastic moral
thought.189 That principle has been affirmed in a recent papal
encyclical.190 To learn more about the Late Scholastics, we will look
to Faith and Liberty, a work by Alejandro A. Chafuen.191 “Chafuen
draws upon many texts largely unfamiliar to English-speaking
audiences to illustrate that the origin of modern economics lies very
much in natural law and scholastic moral theology.”192 In the
process, he reveals the roots of what is now known in the law as the
doctrine of necessity.193 The principle—implemented as the ranking

See id.
Id. at 186.
189 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 13. The Late Scholastics were an economics school of
prescient sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Hispanic moral theorists who employed many
theories that were strikingly close to current economic theory. See, e.g., id. at 14.
190 See Encyclical Letter from Pope Francis, Laudato si’ of the Holy Father: On Care for our
Common Home 68–69 (May 24, 2015), http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclica
ls/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si_en.pdf
(“[E]very
ecological
approach needs to incorporate a social perspective which takes into account the fundamental
rights of the poor and the underprivileged. The principle of the subordination of private
property to the universal destination of goods, and thus the right of everyone to their use, is a
golden rule of social conduct and ‘the first principle of the whole ethical and social order.’”). The
benefits of life do not come without duties to the common good, including, for example, duties
not to consume, pollute, or populate too much. How much is too much? To figure it out we
would need to study the survival of the human species (with a goal of protecting human life
first).
191 CHAFUEN, supra note 10.
Chafuen is an Argentinian economist at George Mason
University. Id. at 171.
192 Samuel Gregg, Blurb of CHAFUEN, supra note 10.
193 CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 43 (“It seems logical that, [after a plane crash], even when
death is not imminent, one could take the fruits in order to prevent future extreme harm.”).
The doctrine of necessity has definitions in criminal law and in tort law:
187
188

1. Criminal law. A justification defense for a person who acts in an emergency that he or
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of life first—ties law, religion, and economics together in a mix of
natural law, moral theology, and the limits of physical reality.194
The Late Scholastics employed natural law theory195 based on the
work of Thomas Aquinas.196 Chafuen shows that over the course of
intellectual history, Thomistic theory—through the Late Scholastics,
and then through the works of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and
Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694)—influenced Adam Smith
(c.1723–1790).197 Smith’s work is largely credited as providing the
foundation of modern economic theory.198
However, the standard neo-classical interpretation of Smith has
been too shallow. Economics provides methods of considering
choices.199 Economics cannot be value-free,200 because there are

she did not create and who commits a harm that is less severe than the harm that would
have occurred but for the person’s actions.
2. Torts. A privilege that may relieve a person from liability for trespass or conversion if
that person, having no alternative harms another’s property in an effort to protect life or
health.
Necessity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
194 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 42, 45.
195 Ethics supports natural law in the following manner:
[T]he human understanding is a proximate source of moral law. The intelligent use of
human understanding to work out moral laws is called right reasoning. Since right
reason[ing] is founded on man’s nature and the natures of other things in his environment,
and since rational appraisal of the suitability or unsuitability of a given action occurs in
the natural course of human life, judgments of right reason are also called natural laws.
V. J. Bourke, Ethics, in 5 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 388, 391 (Berard L Marthaler et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2003) (emphasis added).
196 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 19.
197 See id. at 15–16. As Chafuen explains:
The ideas that gave birth to what has been called the free society were not the result of
spontaneous generation. Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, for example, bears the imprint
of earlier writings, and these were influenced by still earlier writings. . . . It is easy to see
the road leading from some late-medieval thought to Classical Liberal ideas.
Id. at 129.
198 Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 6, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html.
According to Paul
Krugman, “[t]he birth of economics as a discipline is usually credited to Adam Smith, who
published ‘The Wealth of Nations’ in 1776. Over the next 160 years an extensive body of
economic theory was developed, whose central message was: Trust the market.” Id. Krugman
calls faith in the market “the basic presumption of ‘neoclassical’ economics.” Id.
199 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 23.
200 Neo-classical economics holds that economics is value-free. See Charles R. P. Pouncy,
The Rational Rouge: Neoclassical Economic Ideology in the Regulation of the Financial
Professional, 26 VT. L. REV. 263, 278 (2002). Economist Alejandro Chafuen explains,
“economics is the study of the formal implications that can be deduced from the fact that human
beings act purposively. It does not consider whether these actions are good or bad (an ethical
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values implicit in those choices.201 As Lionel Robbins suggests, “[a]
theory of economic policy . . . must take its ultimate criterion from
outside economics.”202 Neo-classical economics is based largely on the
assumption of self-interest in the name of income, profit, or wealth
maximization.203 “The neoclassical model limits its theory of person
to two and only two characteristics: (1) people are rational, and (2)
people are self-interested.”204 There is nothing about lives, morality,
or values.205
How did we get here? The English-speaking world believes that
modern economic theory starts largely with Adam Smith.206 With
Smith as its focus, modern economic theory overlooks the work of
theoreticians who provided the foundation for Smith’s work,
including the Late Scholastics.207 Unlike modern economists, the
Scholastics have no problem making an exception for extreme need:
“extreme need is the exception that confirms the rule: [a]nd this rule
is that private property is in conformance with human nature and
that it promotes and facilitates the conservation of life and human
liberty.”208 This view of the Scholastics is based on the writings of
question), as such [neo-classical] economic science is value-free.” See CHAFUEN, supra note 10,
at 22–23.
201 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 23.
202 LIONEL ROBBINS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY IN ENGLISH CLASSICAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY 177 (1965).
203 See Pouncy, supra note 200, at 297. Self-interest has been translated by economics into
maximization:
[W]hy does the entrepreneur have to maximize profits? Two typical answers run as
follows. First, an evolutionary one: Only those entrepreneurs who maximize profits
survive in a competitive market. Second, an institutional one: Being entrepreneur is a
role institutionally determined that consists of running risks to gain benefits . . . . The
preferences of the entrepreneur are ultimately determined by its social role within the
market.
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, A Preference for Selfish Preferences: The Problem of Motivations in
Rational Choice Political Science, 38 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 361, 365 (2008). What is more, wealth
maximization is the acknowledged purpose of the firm in the two dominant schools of corporate
thought: shareholder primacy and the managerialist school that defends management
discretion. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist
Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 145–46 (2008).
204 John Mixon, Neoclassical Economics and the Erosion of Middle-Class Values: An
Explanation for Economic Collapse, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 327, 328 (2011).
205 See id.
206 See Krugman, supra note 198; see, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free:
Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 614 n.33
(2014) (citing Smith for the classical economic view that free enterprise works to the benefit of
all).
207 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 15–16.
Chafuen provides and describes a tree of
influences. See id.
208 Id. at 42.
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Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274).209
Here, Aquinas provides the basis for what we now know in the law
as the doctrine of necessity.210 However, according to Chafuen, the
Scholastics’ interpretation of extreme need required to support
Thomistic justification is quite limited: “taking goods, which one does
not own can only be justified when there is no other way to avoid the
death of the person.”211 Chafuen notes that being “wounded or
powerless” is sufficient to justify action: “[i]f one might be getting
close to a life-threatening situation, one does not need to wait until
that moment to act.”212 However, this philosophical approach was
expanded slightly by one of these economists.213
The idea of ranking basic rights was conceived by one of the Late
Scholastics, Jesuit economist and Cardinal Juan de Lugo (1583–
1660), as a life-saving—or even liberty-saving—decision tool.214 The
theory was originally designed to be employed by innocent indigents
in time of emergency to protect their basic interests by saving their
lives and liberty.215 Lugo’s example justifying its use pertains to one
who is both innocent and indigent.216 According to Chafuen, ranking
had limited application: “[t]his theory applies when one sees an
imminent danger to life or even liberty, but not when one only runs
the risk of losing goods.”217
Chafuen’s presentation of Lugo’s example of justified use of
another’s property shows that both grave need and indigence are
required:
209 See id.
Theologica:

For example, consider this from Saint Thomas’s famous work, Summa

Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be succored
by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things,
so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the
need be so manifest and urgent that it is evident that the present need must be remedied
by whatever means be at hand (for instance, when a person is in some imminent danger,
and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need
by means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly
speaking theft or robbery.
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA part II-II, q. 66 art. 7 1973, 1974 (Fathers of English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed. 1947).
210 See AQUINAS, supra note 209, at 1974; see, e.g., Necessity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th
ed. 2004).
211 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 42.
212 Id. at 43.
213 See id. at 44.
214 See id. at 15, 45, 64.
215 See id. at 42.
216 See id. at 44–45.
217 Id. at 45.
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[B]ecause if someone, to escape from enemies chasing him,
fears captivity and losing his liberty, and needs a neighbor’s
horse, it seems too harsh and absolutely incredible that he
would not be allowed to take it without the knowledge of the
owner, even if he might not be able to restitute the horse nor
the price for it. For what it seems that the same must be
affirmed if the horse would be necessary for him to escape
from positive grave infamy [like rape] as this can cause no less
suffering than captivity. And for the same reasons, the same
would be in cases of perpetual sickness or similar evils.218
One must be at great risk and have no effective alternatives.219 Only
then can one justify placing their own liberty interest over the
property interests of the owner of the horse necessary to secure that
liberty.220
The activity (the taking) was a necessity, not a choice.221 This is
consistent with cases in the American common law of necessity.222
The law gives some extra latitude to one who attempts to save a
life.223
Lugo’s example seems rather poor. Mere liberty was at stake, not
life.224 However, the example only adds power and significance to the
ranking. The idea of ranking rights and duties may seem new, but
Greek and Roman law ranked legal rights based on a distinction

Id.
See id.
220 See id.
221 See id.
222 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (“There are many cases in the books
which hold that necessity, and an inability to control movements inaugurated in the proper
exercise of a strict right, will justify entries upon land and interferences with personal property
that would otherwise have been trespasses.”).
223 Section 263 of the Restatement Second of Torts addresses privilege created by private
necessity:
218
219

(1) One is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to the chattel
of another or a conversion of it, if it is or is reasonably believed to be reasonable and
necessary to protect the person or property of the actor, the other or a third person from
serious harm, unless the actor knows that the person for whose benefit he acts is unwilling
that he shall do so.
(2) Where the act is for the benefit of the actor or a third person, he is subject to liability
for any harm caused by the exercise of the privilege.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRIVILEGE CREATED BY PRIVATE NECESSITY § 263 (AM. LAW
INST. 1965).
224 See, e.g., CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45.
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between people and things (including animals and slaves).225 Lugo’s
ranking would apply both morally, as a ranking of basic interests,
and legally, as a ranking of basic rights.226 Lugo ranks both basic
interests and the basic rights that they support. The roots of the
ranking, found in Aquinas’s thirteenth-century natural law, predate
the sixteenth-century reformation.227 Thus, the ranking of basic
rights is based in the roots of Western law and religion.228 We have
not only found a basis for the Due Process Clause, to the extent that
our law and religion remain consistent with those roots,229 the
ranking could serve as a fundamental constitutional principle of
ultimate usefulness.
Chafuen describes the original ranking: “[r]ights to life and liberty
are, in a sense, superior to property rights. These [property] rights
evolved to preserve life and liberty. In extreme cases when these
rights seem to be in contradiction, life and liberty should prevail.”230
The use of “extreme cases,” as well as the grave and extreme need in
the example provided by Lugo, indicate that his ranking theory is of
limited use, only in emergencies.231
The principle put forth by Chafuen and Lugo raises liberty’s
importance nearly to equal that of life itself.232 Rather than favor or
disfavor the human right to private property, the principle is
employed to protect the liberty of the human person.233 This can be
done, so long as liberty does not harm life.
This theory need not resolve all conflicts between liberty and
property. Slavery is banned nationally and internationally,234 but
that does not necessarily mean that liberty interests should always
prevail over conflicting property interests. If not, how does one
distinguish circumstances when property rights should prevail and
those where liberty should? As this is about constitutional principles,
225 See Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 471, 492, 493 (1996).
226 See, e.g., CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45.
227 See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 209, at 1974.
228 See, e.g., Paul Babie, Two Voices of the Morality of Private Property, 23 J.L. & RELIGION
271, 272–73, 295–96 (2008).
229 See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., Religious Sources and Dimensions of Human Rights 14 (Emory
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-317, 2013) (“By
1650, Protestants had used this logic to develop and defend almost every one of the
‘fundamental rights and liberties’ that would appear, a century and a half later, in the United
States Bill of Rights of 1791.”).
230 CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45.
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See id. at 42, 45.
234 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Universal Declaration, supra note 37, at art. 4.
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the entire matter would best be thoroughly researched, argued,
carefully resolved, and settled for the purpose of predictability.
It may turn out that we need to place limits on some liberties or
certain kinds of activities in an effort to take into account certain
kinds of property interests. However, it seems much more likely that
liberties would be bent by life interests—e.g. by limiting certain
behavior, activities, or liberties to keep the innocent alive—than by
property interests.235 If we don’t confuse our rights and interests, and
we protect life first, there will likely be fewer issues between liberty
and property.
Lugo developed the ranking of basic rights as a principle for use in
emergencies.236 The significant risk requirement is the functional
equivalent of Lugo’s emergency requirement.237 When there is a
significant risk to life or liberty of the innocent who have not
consented to that risk, Lugo would invoke the ranking.238 We should
do the same for significant risks to life and health. Shortly, we will
take the principal apart to see how it can better help us reduce
significant risks to life and health.
IV. LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY IN U.S. LAW
Natural law theory, dating to Aquinas, not only supported the Late
Scholastics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it provided
the foundation for John Locke in the late seventeenth century, and
the framers of the U.S. Constitution in the late eighteenth century.239
Thus, one should not be surprised to find parallels in word and
thought between the works of the Scholastics and the language of the
U.S. Constitution.240
In the late seventeenth century, John Locke’s Second Treatise on
Government supported the notion that governments may not violate
rights to life, liberty, and property.241 Unfortunately, Locke viewed
life and liberty as one’s own property,242 but I believe his view was
See AQUINAS, supra note 209, at 1974.
See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45.
237 See id.; Keating, supra note 100, at 658.
238 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45.
239 See id. at 14; Steven G. Calabresi & Sofia M. Vickery, On Liberty and the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Original Understanding of the Lockean Natural Rights Guarantees, 93 TEX.
L. REV. 1299, 1304, 1311 (2015).
240 See Calabresi & Vickery, supra note 239, at 1311.
241 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 87, 46 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
1980).
242 See id., § 27, at 19 (“[E]very man has a property in his own person: this no body has any
right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly
235
236
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erroneous.243 The moral Hispanic Scholars, like Juan de Lugo, had
argued that interests in life and liberty outrank those in property.244
The same interpretation is possible using the language inspired by
Locke that remains in our Constitution to this day.245 That language
is open to a more nuanced, safer, and stronger lexical interpretation
in line with late Scholastic moral philosophy; it needs to be
reinterpreted and updated in this time of global emergency.
The U.S. Declaration of Independence sought to protect the
colonists’ “certain unalienable [r]ights” including “[l]ife, [l]iberty and
the pursuit of [h]appiness.”246 But on June 8, 1789, James Madison,
credited with authoring the Bill of Rights, presented to Congress
modified language247 so that the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment protected “life, liberty, or property.”248 This language is
important as these three rights may not be deprived without due
process of law.249 At that time, and in the eighteenth century, the
substitution of property in lieu of the pursuit of happiness was seen
as a substitution of two equivalents.250
This equivalence between the pursuit of happiness and property
may or may not reflect a change from Locke’s earlier view that life
his.”).

243 Without life, we can have no property. Without liberty, we have virtually no basis upon
which to have rights in property. But see id.
244 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45.
245 See John T. Scott, The Sovereignless State and Locke’s Language of Obligation, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 547, 547 (2000).
246 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
247 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 441, 468 (1789) (Gales & Seaton eds., 1824); JACK N. RAKOVE,
JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 94 (Oscar Handlin ed., 2d ed.
2002). Madison’s use of the current language (i.e. life, liberty, and property) had been proposed
in 1788 by the State of New York, the only state that asked Congress to add due process
language. See Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York; July 26, 1788, YALE L.
SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratny.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
248 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Amendment reads in full:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except for cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
249 See id.
250 See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 119 (1988). A century later, Justice Bradley equated “property” with “pursuit of
happiness,” noting that “[r]ights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to
the rights of life, liberty, and property.” See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
116 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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and liberty are property.251 In a sense, the rationale does not matter.
The identity and order of Lugo’s interests matches the appearance of
those same rights in the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments and enables a new, safer constitutional
interpretation of current language.252
Ronald Dworkin talks about the guidance provided by the language
of the due process clauses:
Both the Fifth and the Fourteenth [Amendments] forbid
government to take life or liberty or property without “due
process of law.” The Supreme Court early decided that this
clause was not to be understood as simply procedural, but that
it imposed substantive limits on what government could do no
matter what procedures it followed. But the amendments say
nothing to help judges decide whether due process means that
people have a right to a lawyer before the police can
interrogate them, for example, or that states may not make
contraception or abortion a crime.253
The language of the amendments themselves is open to
interpretation.254 The substantive limits of what the government can
and cannot do are subject to judicial interpretation.255
A. These Rights in the Common Law
Here is the strongest statement in favor of the protection of life:
homicide law—state and federal, statutory, and common law—exists
to protect life.256 We all tend to agree that innocent lives should be
spared.257 Homicide laws back that up.258
In American common law, the right to life is generally superior to
property rights.259 Let us consider examples from the doctrines of

See LOCKE, supra note 241, at § 27.
See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1
(identifying the order in which the three rights appear in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution).
253 DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 127.
254 See id. at 127–28.
255 See id. at 128.
256 See, e.g., Kristi Ayala, Note, The Application of Traditional Criminal Law to
Misappropriation of Gametic Materials, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 503, 514 (1997).
257 See Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, And
What They Ought To Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 805 (2004).
258 See id. at 806.
259 See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa 1971).
251
252
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self-defense and necessity.
The use of deadly force in self-defense places the life of another at
risk. In Katko v. Briney, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the
property owner is not justified in the use of deadly force if no life has
been placed at risk.260 This is the notorious spring gun case.261 For
many, it has been the subject of at least one law school class
session.262 The case is used to demonstrate that the common law
includes a rule that one cannot defend mere unoccupied property
with deadly force.263
The doctrine of necessity likewise protects interests in life and
health ahead of property rights.264 We encounter another classic case
from a typical property law course. In Ploof v. Putnam, the Vermont
Supreme Court denied a trespass claim for dock damage against a
boat owner who moored without permission during a sudden
tempest.265 The court recognized that the need to save a life permits
trespass.266 In the common law, this case stands for the proposition
that an interest in saving life and limb prevails over exclusionary
rights in property law.267 By ranking life over property,268 the
decision protected lives with some loss to the right of exclusion.269 In
the vast majority of cases these days, the right of exclusion would be
upheld.270 It is a rare case that fits well with the doctrine of
necessity.271
The doctrine of necessity arises in criminal law as well.272 It
typically requires an “imminent threat” or otherwise be necessary in

See id.
See Andrew J. McClurg, Poetry in Commotion: Katko v. Briney and the Bards of FirstYear Torts, 74 OR. L. REV. 823, 823 (1995); Robert A. Prentice, Of Tort Reform and Millionaire
Muggers: Should an Obscure Equitable Doctrine Be Revived to Dent the Litigation Crisis?, 32
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 53, 107–08 (1995).
262 See McClurg, supra note 261, at 823.
263 See, e.g., Katko, 183 N.W.2d at 660.
260
261

See Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908).
See id. at 189.
266 See id.
267 See id.; George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral
Points of View, 48 Duke L.J. 975, 986–89 (1999).
268 See Ploof, 71 A. at 189. Ploof is at the intersection of property and torts. See Steven L.
Nichols, Hippocrates, The Patent-Holder: The Unenforceability of Medical Procedure Patents, 5
GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 260 (1997). In addition to tort law, the doctrine of necessity operates
in criminal law. See AQUINAS, supra note 209, at 1974.
269 See Ploof, 71 A. at 189.
270 See, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Webster, 861 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).
271 See Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1090, 1100 (2011).
272 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES 469–70 (Vicki
Been et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2008).
264
265
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time to prevent a minimum amount of harm.273 For example,
necessity has been used to support the saving of lives in the face of
an indictment for revolt against seamen who compelled the captain
to return to port due to the unseaworthiness of the vessel.274 These
cases show long-settled strands of the common law ranking the right
to life over property rights.275
Combine the common law of criminal homicide with the doctrine of
necessity and we can see that innocent life is subject to greater
protection in the law than any liberty or property interests. The
common law, at least part of it, already recognizes the most
important part of the ranking, the primacy of life over other interests.
While Western law has long recognized and supported the special
protection of life over other interests, more recent philosophical
thought has strayed.276 We currently find this kind of thinking in
neo-classical economics, a utilitarian view of human existence.277
B. Substantive Due Process
Current interpretations of the due process clauses are based on a
dichotomy: The due process of law protecting life, liberty, and
property may be either procedural or substantive.278 However, a
ranking of basic rights may more likely be invoked in a substantive
conflict between two rights. Procedural due process claims may have
fewer conflicts between competing basic rights, but they are not
immune.279 Procedural due process rights might, for example, be
used to favor liberty over life, but procedural favoritism is not the
prime area of interest here.
This work is more concerned with substantive due process. Entire

Id. at 470.
See United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 874 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,470) (“The
law deems the lives of all persons far more valuable than any property.”).
275 See Kletter, supra note 152, at §17; J.D. Perovich, Annotation, Use of Set Gun, Trap, or
Similar Device on Defendant’s Own Property, 47 A.L.R.3d 646 § 7 (1973).
276 See CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 90 (15th ed. 2018); Jason Lloyd,
Note, Let There Be Justice: A Thomistic Assessment of Utilitarianism and Libertarianism, 8
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 229, 245, 248 (2003).
277 See William A. Wines & Michael P. Fronmueller, American Workers Increase Efforts to
Establish a Legal Right to Privacy as Civility Declines in U.S. Society: Some Observations on
the Effort and Its Social Context, 78 NEB. L. REV. 606, 622 (1999); see also Draper, Neo-Classical
Economics, supra note 9, at 160−61 (“But that’s what neo-classical economics does; it places a
value on the lives of people and deems those lives expendable if that value is lower than any
conflicting property right before they die.”).
278 See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.1 (5th ed., 2017 update).
279 See Sabbeth, supra note 18, at 1501−02.
273
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books have been written on this subject.280 This Article briefly
considers the same idea, a substantive judicial interpretation of the
clauses. However, this work offers a new substantive interpretation
of the original language by advocating a new substantive due process
with the partitioning and ranking (in lexical priority) of the express
categories of rights of the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Certainly, over time, interpretations of life, liberty, and property
have changed. Ryan Williams has gone to considerable effort to
show, among other things, that the understanding of due process
language of the Fifth Amendment when it was ratified in 1791 was
very different from the understanding of that same language in the
Fourteenth Amendment when it was adopted in 1868.281
Substantive due process282 interpretations developed slowly before
the Civil War and grew through the nineteenth century.283 The
impetus was the protection of the vested rights of growing business
interests from the encroachment of governmental control in the form
of economic or social legislation.284 By the turn of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court had fully embraced the concept and was
ready to use it as a rationale to strike legislation attempting to
restrain the freedom of businesses to contract.285 However, the Court
would not enforce those liberties where state legislation was a true
health or safety measure.286
The now-infamous case Lochner v. New York,287 is an extreme
example of the Supreme Court protecting the right to contract.288
New York had enacted a law limiting the hours that bakers could
280 See EDWARD KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (1996); MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND
REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930S (2001); FRANK R. STRONG,
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE (1986).
281 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 511−12 (2010). But see Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945), (Frankfurter, J.,
separate opinion) (“To suppose that ‘due process of law’ meant one thing in the Fifth
Amendment and another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous to require elaborate rejection.”). To
know that the interpretations have changed is useful. It would also be useful to recognize the
possibility of multiple simultaneous meanings. See Ryan D. Doerfler, Can a Statute Have More
Than One Meaning?, 104 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author).
282 Substantive due process is “[t]he doctrine that the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and
14th Amendments require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further a
legitimate governmental objective.” Due Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
283 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 40, at § 15.1(e), § 15.2.
284 See id. at § 15.2.
285 See id. at § 15.3(a).
286 See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391–92, 398 (1898).
287 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
288 See id. at 64.
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work to sixty hours a week or ten a day.289 Finding the law to be labor
legislation rather than a true health or safety provision, the Court
overturned that law as an unnecessary interference with liberty of
contract between employer and employee.290 It considered such labor
legislation an improper exercise of the state’s police power to
regulate.291
This doctrine of vested rights morphed in the progressive era292 as
it increasingly confronted the concept of police power.293 The Court’s
protection of historic economic freedom (free enterprise) was in
tension with a tradition of the Court sustaining legislation within the
confines of constitutionality.294 Thus, from 1900 to 1936, the Court
failed to follow a systematic or uniform approach with its
implementation of substantive due process.295
The effect of the substantive due process era was the hindering of
federal efforts to regulate commercial behavior during the Great
Depression in the name of police power.296 Never had regulation been
more needed, but for four years, the Supreme Court of the United
States and its subjective natural law analysis stood in the way.297
In 1937, the Court embarked on a new era with the development of
new standards of review.298 Substantive due process analysis of
economic and social welfare legislation was largely displaced by equal
protection analysis.299
Due process rulings have expanded
fundamental rights to include the right to privacy which
encompasses the right to be free from regulation affecting a person’s
sexual and reproductive rights.300 The right to life fits here.
The Court should create a new substantive due process to serve as
a channel to protect the lives and health of the innocent and the non-

See id. at 52.
See id. at 58, 64.
291 See id. at 58.
292 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 40, at § 15.1(c); cf. David E. Bernstein, The History
of “Substantive” Due Process: It’s Complicated, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5−6 (2016) (“Arguably, the
battle on the Court in the 1920s and early 1930s . . . involved moderate Progressives who
sought to preserve some traditional limitations on government authority . . . while mostly
acceding to the growth of progressive regulation on one side; their opponents were more radical
progressives who denied that either the Constitution or anything else put any inherent,
judicially enforceable constraints on the scope of government authority.”).
293 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 40, at § 15.1(c).
294 See id. at § 15.3(a).
295 See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Very Rational Court, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1509, 1515−16 (1993).
296 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 40, at § 15.3(a).
297 See id. at § 15.4(b).
298 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 40, at § 15.4(a).
299 See id.
300 See id.
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consenting from significant risks arising from conflicts that can
develop over rights and interests in liberty or property. In large part,
the current approach does not consider Due Process language from a
substantive perspective.301
Many of the problems we face are of a different nature than those
handled in the 1930s by regulatory law.302 Some of our basic rights
are not being protected.303 For example, when governmental
encouragement of the pursuit of corporate profits or mere property
rights are allowed to kill, whether by legislation, by regulation, by
adjudication, or by internal governmental function, we can see that
current interpretations of the Due Process Clause are flawed.304
Ranking is likely to protect lives better if it is applied across the
board as a broad principle supporting broad implementation. To
better protect life, the ranking of basic rights should extend beyond
strict scrutiny to all standards of review. The system needs to be able
to identify and address current and new significant risks to life.
By changing how we think about and use these words—life, liberty,
and property—we can make law—and everyday life—safer and more
just. At the same time, the ranking of life over liberty and property
would maximize liberty (including privacy) and would work to protect
property rights to the extent that they do not cause significant risk
of impairment of life, health, and at least some liberties.
Life, liberty, and property represent Juan de Lugo’s ranking of
interests, and those same three rights appeared expressly in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States when it was ratified in 1791.305 It is not a coincidence
that these words appeared in these places in this order. Ranking has
See KEYNES, supra note 280, at 29.
See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The
Evolving Relationship Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 129, 155−56 (2015) (“For the first sixty years of the twentieth century . . . the
dominant administrative law model was one of neutral expertise, and administrative agencies
were viewed as merely transmitting legislative policy choices . . . . Over the ensuing decades,
this account was cast aside, replaced by a vision of agencies as fundamentally political,
exercising broad discretion and formulating policies as compromises among competing
interest groups.”).
303 See, e.g, Sabbeth, supra note 18, at 1501–02.
304 See infra Part VI.0; see also Richard Delgado, Idea: You Are Living in a Gold Rush, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 419 (2006) (“Our times . . . are . . . accompanied by a rapid increase in
social inequality, obscenely high corporate profits and executive salaries, official corruption,
and a laissez-faire government averse to regulation or any form of social welfare or
redistribution.”); Daniel W. Morton-Bentley, Law, Economics, and Politics: The Untold History
of the Due Process Limitation on Punitive Damages, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 791, 792
(2012) (contending that the recent punitive damages due process cases were motivated by
politics and a protection of corporate profits).
305 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45; U.S. CONST. amend V.
301
302

PRESERVING LIFE BY RANKING RIGHTS

196

12/3/2018 4:48 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 82.1

been an option all along. While ranking has long remained
overlooked, it is now needed to save lives while maximizing liberty
and property rights and interests.
Consider the hypothetical approach of a dangerous flood. As the
water rises, extreme measures are required to protect lives. The
emergency construction of a levee to protect life—e.g., to prevent the
flooding of a subway—would represent a taking of the land under it.
If a takings claim to prevent or delay construction of the levee306 was
allowed to prevail over the protection of life, it would violate the
ranking. Governments can use and even destroy307 what they need
to protect lives from the flooding of the subway.
C. Regulatory Law in the Land of Liberty
Issues of life, liberty, and property also arise in the terrain of our
regulatory law, and the treatment tends to be very different from that
of common law or substantive due process.308 With at least one
exception,309 the regulatory approach employed here in the United
States tends to allow activity first and regulation later, only if
government recognizes sufficient harm.310 This approach, requiring
harm prior to regulation, defies precaution. The result, especially in
the realm of toxic substances, is seemingly random harm and
death.311 The U.S. approach to risk regulation is exactly the opposite
of that employed by the EU (with its emphasis on precaution).312

306 Presumably this would be an emergency petition for an injunction or some other order to
stop or suspend the work. See, e.g, Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 826 F.3d. 1030, 1033−34 (8th Cir. 2016).
307 The state can go so far as to destroy one class of property to save another. See ROTUNDA
& NOWAK, supra note 40, at § 15.12(c).
308 See Clark v. Sullivan, No. 110,394, slip op. at 3 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005); Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221−22 (2005)).
309 The FDA takes a precautionary approach to the use of new pharmaceuticals by requiring
administrative approval first. New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approva
lapplications/newdrugapplicationnda/default.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2018).
310 See James M. Andris, Jr., Note, Adopting Proactive Standards to Protect Americans in
Indoor Environments: Volatile Organic Compound Emissions Regulation, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1947, 1964 n.106 (2015).
311 Compare CARL F. CRANOR, LEGALLY POISONED: HOW THE LAW PUTS US AT RISK FROM
TOXICANTS 47 (2011) (explaining that developing a random disease and sickness may in fact be
caused by exposure to toxic industrial chemicals without being aware of such exposure), with
FRANK B. GRAD, 7 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, EPA Terms of Environment (2018)
(“Acute Exposure: A single exposure to a toxic substance which may result in severe
biological harm or death.”).
312 See Noga Morag-Levine, The History of Precaution, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1095, 1095 (2014);
see also DAVID VOGEL, THE POLITICS OF PRECAUTION: REGULATING HEALTH, SAFETY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 4 (2012) (examining the shift in
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Consider the internal workings of our federal regulatory system.
From the Reagan administration,313 at least through the Obama
administration, major proposed administrative rulemaking has been
subject to testing with cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).314 By executive order, if
the regulations are major or economically significant, through
internal review at OIRA,315 whether the enabling legislation requires
use of CBA or some other standard,316 administrative agencies must
use CBA as an evaluation tool.317 Not only do we typically need to
prove harm to justify any regulation in the first place, we need to use
CBA to prove that the regulation will not interfere too much with
economic activity.318 More on the implementation of CBA shortly.319
Before we leave regulatory law for now, we should note that there
are slender reeds of another kind of regulatory process at work within
the U.S. system of regulatory law. We have administrative law that
supports regulation using the safe level of risk imposition (e.g., clean
air and clean water) and feasible risk reduction (e.g., occupational
safety).320 We need safety regulation to protect life, and we need
feasible risk reduction to protect liberty.
V. THE POSITION OF NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS
In this part, I briefly review and reject the common utilitarian and
neo-classical economic view of basic rights. Many proponents of neoclassical economic or utilitarian theory advocate an equality or equal
ranking of rights.321 By treating them as equal, the rights are
governmental approaches to regulating risk in the United States and European Union). But
see THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE 521 (Jonathan Wiener et al. eds., 2011).
313 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981), revoked by Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
314 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six Questions (And
Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 170 (2014) [hereinafter Sunstein, Real
World].
315 See id. at 175.
316 See Keating, supra note 100, at 684–85 (describing the use of the safety standard and
feasible risk reduction to control significant risk in legislation).
317 See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 69 (2006); Sunstein, Real World, supra note 314, at 170.
318 See Sunstein, Real World, supra note 314, at 170; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER 5 (2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehou
se.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf.
319 See infra text accompanying notes 417−33.
320 See Keating, supra note 100, at 685–87.
321 Compare, David O. Brink, A Conference Inspired by the Moral and Legal Theory of David
Lyons: Mill’s Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U.L. REV. 1669, 1699 (2010) (“These
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regarded as fungible or tradeable.322 This allows those rights to be
reduced to numerical values on a unitary metric, often the dollar.323
A life, not yet taken, is suddenly worth ten million dollars, soon to be
decimated as that death will not occur for another twenty or thirty
years.324 That statistical death is spread over the population in the
name of a few million dollars of profit for a few.325
With
environmental protections, the calculation is repeated anew by each
polluter.326 Corporations and shareholders benefit often long before
individuals die.327 But we see the growing death toll from cancers
and neurological diseases, and we know something is wrong.328
The basis for these calculations starts here: many neo-classical
economists argue that rights are equal or even fungible.329 For
example, consider the “open-ended and humble” list of ten central
human functional capabilities identified by law and philosophy
professor Martha Nussbaum.330 Law & economics scholars Jonathan
Masur and Eric Posner extract the following list from Nussbaum’s
work: “life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and
thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation (including the goods
of both friendship and self-respect); play; other species; and control
over one’s environment (including both political rights and property

claims . . . imply that whether one possesses a right to particular interests or liberties in a
particular case is not determined by the value of honoring or interfering with that interest or
liberty but by the value of protecting it and/or punishing interference with it. This conception
is a sanction-utilitarian theory of rights.”), with Keating, supra note 100, at 656 (“Cost-benefit
analysis treats all human interests . . . as fungible at some ratio of exchange . . . .”).
322 See Keating, supra note 100, at 656, 660.
323 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1557 (2002).
324 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Best Estimate Selection Bias of Estimates of the Value of a
Statistical Life 22 (Vanderbilt. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No.
17-7, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919555.
325 See Keating, supra note 100, at 660; see also Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm:
The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1399 (2003) (“If there
was one expected statistical death from this large audience of 10,000 participants, and if each
of the participants is willing to pay $500 to eliminate the risk, then it would be possible to raise
$ 5 million collectively from this audience to eliminate the one statistical death to the group,
thus establishing the value of life.”).
326 See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 195; Ackerman & Heinzerling,
supra note 323, at 1557.
327 Cf. CRANOR, supra note 311, 47 (noting that the harm from industrial pollutants may not
be discovered for years after exposure).
328 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS: PUBLIC HEALTH
CHALLENGES 35 tbl.2.7 (2006); CDC: U.S. Deaths from Heart Disease, Cancer on the Rise, AM.
HEART ASS’N (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.heart.org/en/news/2018/05/01/cdc-us-deaths-from-hear
t-disease-cancer-on-the-rise.
329 See Keating, supra note 100, at 656, 660.
330 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 77– 80 (2000).
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rights).”331 They argue that the rights should be treated as being in
the same class or category.332 As I argue elsewhere, their grouping
fails to recognize the prime value of life itself.333
The view that fundamental rights should be treated as of equal
rank is taken by scholars and advocates from Germany,334 the
Netherlands,335 Belgium,336 and even the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights.337 This approach places property and liberty
rights on the same plane as life.338
The risks are imposed on individuals and larger groups, even the
largest group—all of humanity.339 Individually, when the law says
someone else’s property or liberty is just as important as your life, it
stands to reason that you are more likely to find your life at risk. No
one is safe. A legal and economic system focused on short-term
profits, even just indirectly or partially derived at the expense of life,
will eventually take lives, even though the taking may appear to be
random.340
Risks to life also apply to groups.341 The emphasis of neo-classical
economics is on profit, welfare, or, more recently, happiness

331 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
657, 708 (2010).
332 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 330, at 81; Masur & Posner, supra note 331, at 707−08.
333 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 389–91.
334 See AJ VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
160 n.173, 162 n.188 (1999); Catherine Barnard, The Protection of Fundamental Social Rights
in Europe after Lisbon: A Question of Conflicts of Interests, in THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU AFTER LISBON 45, 48 (Sybe de Vries et al. eds., 2013).
335 See Jan Smits, Private Law and Fundamental Rights: A Skeptical View, in
CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF PRIVATE LAW 9, 16–18 (Tom Barkhuysen & Siewert Lindenbergh
eds., 2006) (concluding that fundamental rights do not offer enough guidance due to their
“diffuse character”).
336 See Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Poullet, The Right to Informational Self-Determination
and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy, in
REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 45, 61 n.33 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009) (“This is not an
attempt to reconstruct a ranking of fundamental rights, an exercise that would only undermine
the legitimacy of all fundamental rights including those, which might end up on a ‘higher’
rank.”).
337 See Derya Nur Kayacan, How to Resolve Conflicts Between Fundamental Constitutional
Rights, SAAR BLUEPRINTS, Feb. 2016, at 8, http://jean-monnet-saar.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013
/12/Blueprint-0216.pdf (“[D]ivisions and ranking of rights is artificial.”).
338 Cf. Barnard, supra note 334, at 49 (“[T]he Court implicitly accepted that the economic
and social interests are of equal weight and need to be reconciled through the principle of
proportionality.”).
339 See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 158.
340 Cf. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 338
(1996) (“Ford was denounced in a series of highly publicized exposés for callously choosing to
boost profits at the expense of saving human lives . . . . [A] local Indiana prosecutor decided to
prosecute Ford for manslaughter. Ford ultimately was acquitted.”).
341 See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 232.
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maximization.342 Typically in economics, the focus is on property
rights and use.343 More use means more efficiency, and more
profits.344 The focus is on resulting profits, not on resource use or
impact.345 However, we live in a world with too much consumption,
too much pollution, and too large a population.346 Maximization may
work for us as individuals, but collectively, the implementation of
that theory puts all of humanity at risk.347 When the theory of
maximization helps the human population exceed our planetary
limits, environmental overshoot and collapse become significant
risks.348
As we have already seen, much like neo-classical economics,
libertarianism,349 which focuses on liberty and property as the prime
rights,350 fails to adequately protect life.351 Such a position invites
risk to life by giving it the same moral value as liberty, property, and
other rights. In the interest of justice, property and profit should
neither be of prime importance nor should they be placed on a par
with life itself. The same holds true for liberty. Liberty is nothing
without life; they should not be treated as equal. A proper and safe
ranking of basic rights forces rejection of the libertarian position.
Now let’s consider some more-specific risks from failing to reject the
fungibility of basic rights.

342 See MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 33 (2012); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 63, 100 (1990); Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk
Choice, 42 EMORY L.J. 1, 67 (1993).
343 See David M. Morrison, Bridgeport Redux: Digital Sampling and Audience Recording, 19
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 75, 77 (2008).
344 See Claire Moore Dickerson, How Do Norms and Empathy Affect Corporation Law and
Corporate Behavior?: Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social Responsibility,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1431, 1434−35 (2002); Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American
Dream, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 417, 430 (2008).
345 See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 161; Susan L. Smith, Ecologically
Sustainable Development: Integrating Economics, Ecology, and Law, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
261, 293 (1995).
346 See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE, at xxiii (2002); DIAMOND, supra note 22,
at 487−88; DONELLA MEADOWS ET AL., LIMITS TO GROWTH: THE 30-YEAR UPDATE 166 (2004).
347 See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 160.
348 See MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 346, at 164, 167.
349 Libertarians and neo-classical economists are not one and the same, although they
probably have some overlap, and their interests in maximization often align. See Rena Mara
Samole, Note, Real Employees: Cognitive Psychology and the Adjudication of Non-Competition
Agreements, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 289, 317 n.139 (2000).
350 See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 100–02 (2010).
351 Cf. Lloyd, supra note 276, at 247 (“Because property rights are superior . . . [s]uch a
theory allows a person to do virtually anything imaginable to himself - even commit suicide because harm to oneself ‘must’ be allowed in a Libertarian regime.”).
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VI. INVERSIONS
If basic rights are all of the same weight, the unpredictable jostling
of everyday life will from time to time place one right above another.
When life and health lose to other rights and interests, the position
of the right to life has become inverted relative to those other rights.
A liberty or property right or interest has been given a priority over
that life. In this way, the concept of an inversion may be a useful tool
for seeing and understanding conflicts between different types of
rights.
A. Risks of Inversions
Western law has a history of running into trouble by failing to rank
basic rights.352 This phenomenon is easiest to see when we consider
the risks of inversions.
To begin, let’s contrast property and liberty. Property interests or
property rights may be commodified or compensated, whereas our
choices bind us, especially sets or groupings of choices.353 Many of us
are born with some of those groupings, such as our culture, including
our religion.354 This represents our liberty, which includes privacy,
an aspect of liberty355 or an inverse liberty. Liberties also include
such fundamental rights as speech, press, assembly, voting, and
abortion.356 There are an infinite number of liberties, but our
constitution provides special protection for such fundamental
liberties.357
It is the risk to life stemming from conflicts between liberty or
property rights and life (including health) that matters here. As we
See DIAMOND, supra note 22, at 488–90.
See Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Nancy C. Marcus, Beyond Romer and Lawrence: The Right to Privacy Comes
out of the Closet, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 355, 376 (2006).
354 See Lauren Sudeall Lucas, The Free Exercise of Religious Identity, 64 UCLA L. REV. 54,
68 (2017).
355 See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69–71 (Ga. 1905); Anita L. Allen, Race
and Ethnicity: Race, Face, and Rawls, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1677, 1680–81 (2004).
356 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really
Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 150 (2008) (“The Court first alluded to the
right to vote as fundamental as far back as 1886 . . . [but] [i]n several key areas of election law
jurisprudence, the Court has vacillated between analyzing the right to vote as a fundamental
right and treating it as something other than fundamental.”); Chelsea M. Donaldson, Note,
Constitutional Law/Reproductive Justice - Breaking the TRAP: How Whole Woman’s Health
Protects Abortion Access, and the Substantive Due Process Clause’s Rebuke of Anti-Abortion
Regulations, 40 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257, 297–98 (2018) (noting that abortion is still a
fundamental right under current Supreme Court decisions).
357 See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 403 (2018).
352
353
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shall see, if we fail to properly resolve those conflicts, we place
ourselves, individually358 and collectively—even as a species—at
significant risk of harm or demise.
Bad things tend to happen when property rights prevail over rights
to life and health.359 Likewise, when liberty rights prevail over life
and health.360 We will now examine the risks in failing to honor the
ranking of the right to life ahead of liberty and property rights.
1. Property Over Life
Governmental action advancing property rights, in the interest of
profit, over someone’s right to life can be a symptom of the impact of
neo-classical economics on the law.361 Some of these actions likely
predate this movement in economics.362 Kathryn Sabbeth observes
that some legislatures and courts have been placing interest in profit
over life and health for decades:
It might seem intuitive that the higher the stakes for the
individual, the more effort should be expended to protect those
interests, but the current structure of the legal system
suggests otherwise. Substantive and procedural rights often
rank basic human needs below property rights. As just one
example, many states expedite and streamline eviction
proceedings; removing a tenant from her home is,
procedurally, faster and easier than recovering a nominal sum
of money. The defendant’s potential deprivation of shelter
receives relatively little attention in the design of the
adjudication system.363
This inversion is an example of how legislatures smooth the
procedural system to protect the property rights of landlords. Such
property rights should be considered only after accounting for any
358 Concerns for individual rights and human survival are both rooted in the intersection of
the natural and the human creation. We apply this sacredness to even the most immature
embryo. See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 83.
359 See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 340, at 337−38; Noga Morag-Levine, The Problem of
Pollution Hotspots: Pollution Markets, Coase, and Common Law, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
161, 188−89 (2007).
360 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
361 See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Tax Policy in an Era of Rising Inequality:
The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1747−48 (2005).
362 See Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the
United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553, 595 (1994).
363 Sabbeth, supra note 18, at 1501–02.
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possible significant risk to the lives and health of the tenants.
In regulatory law, the urgent problem is the protection of life. The
internal workings of our regulatory system endanger the very people
who should be protected by congressional legislation enabling the
regulations, especially if that legislation requires implementation of
the safety or feasibility standards.364 The protection of property
interests through CBA’s lower regulatory standards works to harm
the health and lives of millions.365
Our cancer rates tell part of the story of this inversion.366 We are
experiencing a molecular death by poisoning that is silent and
invisible.367 The effect of that poisoning may manifest itself in
diseases of the nervous system,368 dementia,369 and various
cancers.370 At least some of it is happening as a result of CBA.371
Before we proceed, let us note how basic due process rights are in
law. Life and liberty rights are enshrined in international law,372
and, as part of the U.S. Bill of Rights, they are not subject to
See Keating, supra note 100, at 685, 687, 747−48.
Compare ADLER & POSNER, supra 347, 178 (2006) (“It is now common practice for
regulatory agencies conducting CBA to include lives lost or saved as a cost or benefit, often
using a monetary value.”), and Keating, supra note 100, at 660−61(“Cost-benefit analysis
supposes that loss of life or health by some can always be offset by increase in wealth to others,
no matter how trivial the effect of that increased wealth may be in the lives of those who benefit
from it.”), with William J. Aceves, Valuing Life: A Human Rights Perspective on the Calculus of
Regulation, 36 L. & INEQ. 1, 47 (2018) (“While regulatory decisions are often less visible than
other forms of government action, they may still have a profound impact on mortality
risks. . . . [U]sing cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations to determine mortality risks in
these regulatory fields can readily implicate the right to life norm.“).
366 See CRANOR, supra note 311, at 48; Keating, supra note 100, at 686; CDC: U.S. Deaths
from Heart Disease, Cancer on the Rise, supra note 328.
367 See CRANOR, supra note 311, at 47.
368 See Hussien Ahmed et al., Parkinson’s Disease and Pesticides: A Meta-Analysis of Disease
Connection and Genetic Alterations, 90 BIOMEDICINE & PHARMACOTHERAPY 638, 640 (2017)
(providing evidence that pesticide exposure is significantly associated with the risk of
Parkinson’s disease and alterations in genes involved in Parkinson’s disease pathogenesis); see
also Laurie H. Sanders et al., Base Excision Repair Variants and Pesticide Exposure Increase
Parkinson’s Disease Risk, 158 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 188, 189, 191 (2017) (finding that exposure
to certain pesticides induces oxidative stress and increases the risk of Parkinson’s disease).
369 See Lewis O. J. Killin et al., Environmental Risk Factors for Dementia: A Systematic
Review, 16 BMC GERIATRICS 175, 5, 25 (2016) (finding that extensive review suggests that
future research focus on a short list of environmental risk factors for dementia.).
370 See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 25,
97, 131 (2d ed. 2016); CRANOR, supra note 311, at 2 n.6.
371 Arguably, moral commitments need to be taken into account in CBA, or there is a possible
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral
Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 103 U. VA. L. REV. 1809, 1858–59 (2017).
Unfortunately, our norms of chemical usage have not changed. This shows that our moral
commitment to life has not been embedded in CBA. That is asking too much for a welfarist
theory based on a unitary metric. See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 231–
32.
372 See Universal Declaration, supra note 37, art. 3.
364
365
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election.373 Why, then, should matters of economic activity be allowed
to interfere with the protection of the lives of others? Our first
responders do what they can to preserve lives, and some of those
activities come at great cost.374 However, more to the point, our
mutual rights in life help assure us that corresponding duties
preclude a right (of government or anyone) to benefit from early
deaths.375
Let us turn to the internal workings of our federal regulatory
system, arguably not subject to review by any court.376 As already
noted,377 OIRA is responsible for the internal review and approval of
new regulations using CBA.378 For each proposed regulation coming
under its scrutiny, OIRA distills and compares costs and benefits as
part of conducting the CBA inquiry with a unitary metric (typically
dollars).379 When a major new pollution standard would statistically

373

Remember this forceful statement of Justice Jackson in Barnette:

The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly,
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections.
W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). An election could be held when
there is an equality and commensurability of basic rights on both sides of an issue.
374 See Emergency Preparedness and Response. Input: Occupational Safety and Health Risks,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 20, 2013), https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/progra
ms/epr/risks.html.
375 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 323, at 1553−54 (2002); cf. Aceves, supra note
365, at 65 (“Partisan influence and bureaucratic bias must be removed from the calculus of
regulation when human life is at stake. Greater care must be taken when monetizing human
life. In the calculus of regulation, miscalculations carry great costs. Simply stated,
‘[u]ndervaluing life leads to death.’”). Greater care is not enough. Human lives should not be
monetized.
376 See Masur & Posner, supra note 331, at 667. Who could possibly have standing to bring
an action against an internal review? If it is to be those at significant risk of death, and they
are, say, one hundred, seemingly random statistical people, there can be no adequate legal
proof of cause and effect at this point. Thus, even well-meaning bureaucrats can help kill. To
solve the internal governmental problem, we might need both a constitutional ban on allowing
the valuation and taking of statistical lives in return for liberty or property considerations and
a lasting solution to the standing problem. Here, we are considering environmental crime.
When crime will take a life, “[c]rime has a human face, and that face deserves standing and a
say in the matter.” Stephanos Bibas, Mercy and Clemency: Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure,
4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 337 (2007).
377 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
378 See Sunstein, Real World, supra note 314, at 170.
379 See id. at 170, 171–72; see also John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative
Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 413 (2008) (“[A] common metric is crucial when
comparing the consequences of different regulatory alternatives and when weighing the gains
to beneficiaries against the losses realized by those made worse off.”).
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foresee the loss of, say, 100 lives more than would a different
standard, to help make the decision, each life is given a value. That
amount is typically about $10 million today.380 The cumulative
difference would then be $1 billion.381 The benefits, the lives saved
by the regulations, justify costs up to $1 billion.382 Activities with
costs projected to exceed $1 billion would be allowed to prevail over
protective regulation.383
The first problem is the matter of pricing lives. Will you take $10
million for your life? In 2000, the value of statistical life was about
six million dollars.384 Does the additional four million dollars help
you feel any better about giving up your life? Does it help you feel
safer? What if you are one of the statistical people whose life is taken
so that someone, usually but not always someone else, can make more
than $10 million? What does that do for your sense of justice?
CBA places a value on the statistical lives of people and deems
those lives expendable if that value is lower than any conflicting
property right before they die.385 These calculations are known as the
value of a statistical life (VSL).386
VSL is commonly regarded by economists as essential to
calculating the costs and benefits of environmental regulations.387
Avoided deaths are the basis (the benefit) for implementing many
such regulations.388 Since the government uses VSL (in its internal
regulatory review), Kip Viscusi advocates that corporations use VSL
as a shield, even a safe harbor, in decision-making where risk
involves the loss of lives.389 If VSL is safe and acceptable for

See Sunstein, Real World, supra note 314, at 182 n.66, 188.
See generally id. at 181–82 (providing an example where the total benefits are calculated
based on the VSL and the estimated number of people saved).
382 See id. at 179 (discussing that benefits justify the costs when the monetized benefits
exceed the monetized costs).
383 See id. (“If the monetized benefits are lower than the monetized costs, agencies may
choose not to submit the draft rule at all, unless there are special considerations (such as a
legal obligation or important nonquantifiable benefits).”).
384 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 61.
385 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 323, at 1553−54.
386 See W. Kip Viscusi & Clayton J. Masterman, Income Elasticities and Global Values of
Statistical Life, 8 J. BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 226, 227 n.1 (2017) (“The VSL is the monetary
value of small changes in mortality risks, scaled up to reflect the value associated with one
expected fatality in a large population.”). See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9,
at 208 (“Economists’ measurements of that value are often based on labor market data.”).
387 See Viscusi & Masterman, supra note 386, at 227; Draper, Neo-Classical Economics,
supra note 9, at 201.
388 See Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk
Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1197−98 (2005).
389 See W. Kip Viscusi, Pricing Lives for Corporate & Governmental Risk Decisions, 6 J.
BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 227, 242 (2015). “[A] reasonable middle ground between infinity and
380
381
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governmental use, it must be safe for the private sector.390
Unfortunately, as its use increases, in effect, VSL becomes a
seemingly random, but increasing form of statistical death.391 And
that flies in the face of public preferences.392
In this context, let’s examine discounting. As the proposed rule and
the lives saved occur at different times, discounting is employed.393
Using “standard discount rate”394 of seven percent, in about ten years,
those $10 million dollar lives are only going to be worth about $5
million in protection. Thus, if those $10 million-lives will be lost in
an average of ten years from today, they are only worth half as much.
Here is the effect: with the reduction in value of those statistical lives,
twice as much harm would be allowed. And if the average loss occurs
after 40 years, those lives have vanishing little value.
By discounting, we get more consumption and more pollution.395
The pollution takes time to do its work.396 Those future deaths are
worth less than deaths today.397 The lives are on sale. The deaths
are foreseeable. And it’s allowed.
The property right implicit in those millions of dollars is then
lifetime earning” produces a VSL of about $9 million. Id. at 244. More precisely, your life is
now worth between $9.7 and $11.5 million. See Viscusi, supra note 324, at 22. It is even
possible to calculate VSLs for those in other countries. In lower income countries, life
valuations range as low as $107,000. See Viscusi & Masterman, supra note 386, at 229.
390 See James K. Hammitt, On Balance: Review of “Pricing Lives: Guideposts for a Safer
Society” by W. Kip Vicusi, SOC’Y FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS (May 25, 2018), https://benefitcost
analysis.org/balance-review-”pricing-lives-guideposts-safer-society”-w-kip-viscusi.
391 See Graham, supra note 379, at 497 (“When federal agencies estimate WTP for small risk
reductions, they use a summary statistic called the ‘value of statistical life’ (VSL). If 100,000
people are each exposed to a mortality risk of 1 in 100,000, then one statistical death is
expected. If the average WTP to prevent the risk is $ 50 per person, then the VSL for the
population is $ 5 million.”).
392 We tend not to view deaths and dollars the same way, suggesting that public preferences
may differ from CBA recommendations. See Emmanuel Kemel & Corina Paraschiv, Deciding
About Human Lives: An Experimental Measure of Risk Attitudes Under Prospect Theory, 51
SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 163, 183 (2018).
393 See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 205–07.
394 In 2004, economists used “a standard ‘discount rate’ (about 7 percent annually) to convert
future dollars into current equivalents.” Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, NEW
REPUBLIC (Mar. 15, 2004), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/your-money-oryour-life. “With a 7 percent discount rate . . . $1000 in twenty years is worth only $260 today.”
Id. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget has also embraced a seven percent discount
rate as part of its regulatory review. SeeERROR! MAIN DOCUMENT ONLY. OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-94, GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT RATES
FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1992).
395 See WILSON, supra note 346, at xxiii; Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at
206–07.
396 There is a clear linkage between pollution and mortality.
See W. Walker Hanlon,
Pollution and Mortality in the 19th Century 3, 34, 37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 21647, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2675920.
397 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 323, at 1571.
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allowed to outweigh lives, only because those lives are merely
statistical. We do not protect unpredictable statistical lives as much
as we do predictable ones.398 The anonymity of cause and effect for
different risks for different people in this world (and even just in the
United States) protects the killers of those who have not consented to
the risk.399 The sick and dying cannot ever prove who caused their
cancer.400 Instead, justice requires that all lives be protected first,
using the safety or feasibility standards, to the point of insignificance
of risk.401
This example of an inversion serves as a better example of a
possible benefit from employing ranking than that provided by Juan
de Lugo in his presentation of the principle.402 Such a placement of
the property interests of those being regulated above the statistical
lives that are valued, and then devalued using discounting,
represents a massive inversion with enormous consequences in
suffering and lives lost.403
Another example of an inversion of property and life is provided by
Judge (now Mr. Justice) Neil Gorsuch’s dissent in the “frozen
trucker”404 case.405 Judge Gorsuch treated the life and health of a
truck driver in a dangerous winter storm as less important than the
property rights of the trucking company.406 Apparently Judge
398 See Marc Lipsitch et al., Underprotection of Unpredictable Statistical Lives Compared to
Predictable Ones, 37 RISK ANALYSIS 893, 900 (2017).
399 Cf. id. (“[T]he legal literature suggests . . . corporations make decisions about their
structure precisely to make the most hazardous subsidiaries the most asset-poor, and to use
debt financing to further reduce the assets of corporations that risk unpredictable accidents.”).
400 See Why Is It Difficult to Pinpoint the Exact Cause of a Person’s Cancer?, DANA-FARBER
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://blog.dana-farber.org/insight/2017/01/why-is-it-difficult-to-pinpoint-theexact-cause-of-a-persons-cancer/.
401 See Keating, supra note 100, at 700.
402 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 44−45.
403 See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 152 (2004); see also Lisa
Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 189, 204−05, 207 (2000)
(“Describing human lives in statistical terms thus creates the conditions under which human
suffering and loss can be conceived of in economic terms, and under which this suffering and
loss can be allowed to continue simply because the monetary value we have attached to them
is lower than the costs of avoiding them.”).
404 Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Neil Gorsuch and the “Frozen Trucker”, SLATE (Mar. 21,
2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/03/neil_gorsuch_s_
arrogant_frozen_trucker_opinion_shows_he_wants_to_be_like.html.
405 Transam Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., No. 15-9504, 2016 WL 3909526, at *7
(10th Cir., July 15, 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
406 See id. at *8. The driver’s fuel was below the ‘E’ for empty, and he stopped his truck in
an effort to locate his approved fuel source. Id. at *1. The trailer’s brakes froze, and the driver
could not unlock them. Id. When he called his dispatcher, he was told not to leave the trailer
and that help was on the way. Id. After his heater failed, he continued to wait another two
hours until he was awakened by a relative’s phone call. Id. The driver’s speech was slurred,
and he could not feel his torso. Id. He called his dispatcher and was told to continue to wait
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Gorsuch’s concept of Due Process does not include the protection of
life.407
Fortunately, the Tenth Circuit panel’s majority saw otherwise and
held that the trucking company erroneously dismissed the truck
driver for leaving his disabled trailer for his own health and safety.408
Nevertheless, the Gorsuch dissent placed the employer’s property
rights over the freezing employee’s health and safety rights.409 How
close to death must an employee be to obtain legal protection from
Judge Gorsuch? Whether state action is administrative, legislative,
or judicial,410 placing property rights above the life and health of the
for help. Id. Fifteen minutes after he unhitched and left the trailer to get fuel, roadside
assistance arrived, and the driver returned. Id. He was discharged a week later for abandoning
his load. Id. at *2. The trucker did not consent to freeze to death when he took his job. He
consented to the risks of driving a load but not to being required to risk death to protect the
load.
407 See id. at *8.
408 See id. at *3−4 (majority opinion).
409 According to Judge Gorsuch,
A trucker was stranded on the side of the road, late at night, in cold weather, and his
trailer brakes were stuck. He called his company for help and someone there gave him
two options. He could drag the trailer carrying the company’s goods to its destination (an
illegal and maybe sarcastically offered option). Or he could sit and wait for help to arrive
(a legal if unpleasant option). The trucker chose None of the Above, deciding instead to
unhook the trailer and drive his truck to a gas station. In response, his employer,
TransAm, fired him for disobeying orders and abandoning its trailer and goods.
It might be fair to ask whether TransAm’s decision was a wise or kind one. But it’s not
our job to answer questions like that. Our only task is to decide whether the decision was
an illegal one. The Department of Labor says that TransAm violated federal law, in
particular 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B). But that statute only forbids employers from firing
employees who “refuse[ ] to operate a vehicle” out of safety concerns. And, of course,
nothing like that happened here. The trucker in this case wasn’t fired for refusing to
operate his vehicle. Indeed, his employer gave him the very option the statute says it
must: once he voiced safety concerns, TransAm expressly—and by everyone’s admission—
permitted him to sit and remain where he was and wait for help. The trucker was fired
only after he declined the statutorily protected option (refuse to operate) and chose instead
to operate his vehicle in a manner he thought wise but his employer did not. And there’s
simply no law anyone has pointed us to giving employees the right to operate their vehicles
in ways their employers forbid. Maybe the Department would like such a law, maybe
someday Congress will adorn our federal statute books with such a law. But it isn’t there
yet. And it isn’t our job to write one—or to allow the Department to write one in Congress’s
place.
Id. at *7.
410 Actions undertaken by the judicial branch, including court enforcement of private legal
rights, should be considered state acts under the state action doctrine. See Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948), abrogated by Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). Lugar
recognized that that “the party charged with the deprivation [of a federal right] must be a
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Id. at 937, 940 n.21. The Court further
rejected the notion “that a private party’s mere invocation of state legal procedures’” satisfies
the state-actor requirement. Id. at 940 n.21, 951 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Firstenberg v. Monribot, 350 P.3d 1205, 1217 (N.M. App. 2015) (“[W]e reject the notion that
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innocent is unmerciful. “Justice without mercy is cruelty.”411
The Due Process Clauses are there to protect life first, ahead of
other interests. This is a matter of protection based on the lexical
priority of current Due Process language rather than a matter of
liability based on other statutory or constitutional authority.
Money should not be weighed against lives in being. Even if the
fiscal benefits accrue to you, the criminal law of homicide says that
your life is worth more than anything I can pay you in advance to
gain the right to take it.412 All too often the fiscal interests of
management and their shareholders gain priority over significant
risks to the lives of others.413 When deaths result from such behavior,
prosecutions should follow.
There are a million ways for lives to be placed at significant risk.
What about when the government decides to repurpose land
currently occupied by a hospital? Can the government close a
hospital when statistical loss of life is certain to result? The
government may close the hospital, but it should be obligated to
provide feasible substitutes (e.g., a new health clinic, transportation
to a different hospital, portable dialysis units) to extinguish or reduce
foreseeable significant risks of loss of life.
2. Property Over Liberty
The details of sorting the intertwined rights of property and liberty
might fill many books depending on how one wants to sort out the
issue. At one extreme, the abolition of slavery414 makes it clear that

Mr. Firstenberg’s lawsuit . . . was somehow transformed, by virtue of the district court’s
adjudication of the matter, into an equal protection lawsuit under the ADA.”). Nevertheless, it
is reasonable to expect that government, any branch of government, would protect our lives, if
presented with significant risk. That is part of the basis for having government in the first
place.
411 Luiz Sérgio Solimeo, Mercy Without Justice Is the Mother of Dissolution; Justice Without
Mercy Is Cruelty, THE AM. SOC’Y FOR THE DEF. OF TRADITION, FAM. AND PROP. (June 2, 2011),
http://www.tfp.org/mercy-without-justice-is-the-mother-of-dissolution-justice-without-mercyis-cruelty/#easy-footnote-bottom-3-27739.
412 One cannot contract to die at the hands of others, a close parallel to physician-assisted
suicide, which is against public policy. See Myers v. Schneiderman, 85 N.E.3d 57, 65 (N.Y.
2017). Most states recognize suicide as a crime. See Scott P. Johnson & Robert M. Alexander,
The Rehnquist Court and the Devolution of the Right to Privacy, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 621, 642
(2003).
413 See Martin L. Hirsch, Side Effects of Corporate Greed: Pharmaceutical Companies Need
A Dose of Corporate Social Responsibility, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 607, 608 (2008); Don
Sapatkin, Cherry Hill Mom: Daughter’s Opioid Death Was Caused by ‘Corporate Greed’, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www2.philly.com/philly/health/addiction/mccaskill-opioid-ma
rketing-hearing-on-insys-fentanyl-brand-subsys-sarah-fuller-20170912.html.
414 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.

PRESERVING LIFE BY RANKING RIGHTS

210

12/3/2018 4:48 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 82.1

at least some interests in liberty should prevail over interests in
property.415 Issues of slavery and serfdom continue.416 However, the
matter is not so simple. Here in the Land of Liberty, we can find
numerous examples of our data–which may be part and parcel of our
liberty and privacy–being “propertized.”417 Our norms and our
precedent place great value on property rights.418 And with advances
in technology, we find that liberty and property interests are
Fortunately, it is
increasingly entangled and in conflict.419
unnecessary to attempt to resolve here the questions of whether or
when property interests should prevail over fundamental and other
liberties as the scope of this article is limited to protecting life as the
foremost fundamental and basic right.
3. Liberty Over Life
There is an old saying to the effect that “[y]our right to swing your
arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.”420 Allowing my
interests in liberty even to equal your health and well-being may
allow me, at times, to claim special circumstances for a right to swing
my fist past the point where your nose begins. Such a “right” would
be both a moral and a legal wrong.
Rights to life and health should not be surpassed by the liberty
415 See Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship Between
the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1408 (2018).
416 See JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW DIGITAL
SERFDOM 96 (2017); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Slaves to the Bottom Line: The Corporate Role in
Slavery from Nuremberg to Now, 46 STETSON L. REV. 167, 168 (2016); Tiffany T.V. Duong, The
True Cost of “Cheap” Seafood: An Analysis of Environmental and Human Exploitation in the
Seafood Industry, 24 HASTINGS ENVTL L.J. 279, 285 (2018); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The ‘Internet
of Things’ Is Sending Us Back to the Middle Ages, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://theconversation.com/the-internet-of-things-is-sending-us-back-to-the-middle-ages-8143
5.
417 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269, 1270 (2005).
418 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Ideas on Originalism:
Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 815–16 (2009).
419 See Vikas Shah, How the Internet and Digital Culture Affect Rights and Liberties,
THOUGHT ECON. (Feb. 9, 2010), https://thoughteconomics.com/how-the-internet-and-digital-cul
ture-affect-rights-and-liberties/.
420 This quote has been ascribed to Abraham Lincoln without attribution.
A similar
quotation, “The right to swing my fist ends where the other man’s nose begins,” has been
ascribed to Oliver Wendell Holmes without current support. Matthew C. Kane & Ivan L.
London, The Pride of the Common Law: Oklahoma’s Struggle with the Prima Facie Tort Action,
52 TULSA L. REV. 41, 43 (2016). “Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s
nose begins,” has support. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L.
REV. 932, 957 (1919). For more on the rich history of this saying, see Your Liberty to Swing
Your Fist Ends Just Where My Nose Begins, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, http://quoteinvestigator.com
/2011/10/15/liberty-fist-nose/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2018).
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interests and rights of others without fully informed prior consent.
Protection of life is the most important feature when ranking
rights.421 Without life, we can have no liberty or property. Activities
that shorten individual lives should be nudged, limited, controlled,
banned, or taxed as feasible.422
Consent is important. Let’s say the government decides to raise
the speed limit. Interests in convenience and lower time costs
combine to outweigh the risks of additional loss of life. This appears
to be an inversion.423 However, everyone who drives consents to the
rules and the risks of motorcycles, Maseratis, and tanker trucks.424
If they don’t know the rules and the risks, they don’t get a license.425
Even as a passenger, if you get into a car, you are consenting to the
risks of riding. Speed limits can be adjusted.426
There also should be a provision for facing risks to life that are
greater in number or in gravity. By this approach, the protection
against a high risk of the death of millions would win out over an
equally great risk to the lives of thousands. We cannot protect all life
at all costs.
To prove to secular skeptics that this work does not support an
unlimited right to life, we return to the constitutional battleground
of abortion. On its face, the abortion right would appear to place the
liberty right of the woman over the life right of the fetus.427 However,
421 “[D]ead people cannot exercise their rights.” Amitai Etzioni, Life: The Most Basic Right,
9 J. HUM. RTS. 100, 105 (2010).
422 See Robert F. Blomquist, Models and Metaphors for Encouraging Responsible Private
Management of Transboundary Toxic Substance Risk: Toward A Theory of International
Incentive-Based Environmental Experimentation, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 545–46
(1997); Harold C. Reeder, The ‘Law of Tobacco’ Is A Major Contributing Factor that Hampers
Effective Resolution to the Country’s Tobacco Problem, 6 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 17, 133–34
(2004). The remedies need to be fair first and may need to be tailored to the situation. This is
a prime area for additional research and publication. One can easily imagine age limits and
high taxes for tobacco users.
423 See Philip A. Hamburger, The Inversion of Rights and Power, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 731, 733
(2015).
424 See Driver’s Manual, N.Y. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLE 10, https://dmv.ny.gov/brochure/mv2
1.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); Implied Consent, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
425 See Driver’s Manual, supra note 424, at 10; Suspended License, DEP’T MOTOR VEHICLE,
https://www.dmv.org/suspended-license.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
426 See Speed Limit Basics, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speedm
gt/ref_mats/fhwasa16076 (last visited Sept. 21, 2018).
427 See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 18. The right to life is subject to challenge. Possible
sentience is consistent with viability, at some point after 26 weeks. See id. at 17. “[A] fetus
does not have the neural substrate necessary for interests of any kind until some point
relatively late in its gestation.” Id. at 18. The fetus has no rights as it cannot have interests
at the time the abortion is performed. See id. at 18, 19. In the Jewish law that undergirds our
Western legal system, “a fetus is not a person, and no person is in existence until the infant
emerges from the womb into the world.” Id. at 37. Due to respect and love for both mother and
fetus, there should not be an automatic priority for either party. See id. at 38. The decision to

PRESERVING LIFE BY RANKING RIGHTS

212

12/3/2018 4:48 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 82.1

in our overcrowded world this analysis is incomplete. On an
overpopulated planet, bringing more human mouths to the table will
effectively displace other lives in being – and, with environmental
overshoot and the erosion of the life support system of the planet, an
increasing population causes increasing risks to the lives of all.428 We
may not yet be at a ratio of one-birth-to-one-death,429 but I believe we
are well on our way.430
As Ronald Dworkin observes, “the real argument against abortion
is that it is irresponsible to waste human life without a justification
of appropriate importance.”431 Protecting the planet from human
overpopulation constitutes such a justification. Neither a fetus nor
her parents have an unlimited right to displace human lives already
on this planet.432 This is particularly the case early in the pregnancy
when the fetus has no sentience or interest.433 To allow unlimited
reproductive rights to continue invites eventual mass death, even
genocide.434
However, if humanity succeeds in reducing its
raise or abort is a deep personal choice.
428 See Overpopulation: The Causes, Effects and Potential Solutions, RENEWABLE
RESOURCES COALITION (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.renewableresourcescoalition.org/overpopula
tion-causes-effects-solutions/.
429 See WIRED STAFF, Earth Hurtles Toward 6.5 Billion, WIRED (Feb. 21, 2006, 02:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2006/02/earth-hurtles-toward-6-5-billion/. Human population exceeds
the planet’s optimal long-term population by about fifty percent. See id. One expert assessment
by Joel Cohen, professor of demography at Rockefeller and Columbia Universities, “estimates
that if we want to support individuals indefinitely—allotting each person 3,500 calories per day
from wheat and 247,000 gallons per year of fresh water―the planet has room for only about 5
billion people.” Id. Although that may seem like quite a lot of water per person, one must
remember that the greatest amount of water we use per person goes to food production. See
JOEL E. COHEN, HOW MANY PEOPLE CAN THE EARTH SUPPORT? 308 (1995). Human population
currently stands at about 7.5 billion, and at this rate, in the next 30 years, we will approach
nine billion. See World Clocks, TRANQUILEYE, https://www.tranquileye.com/clock/ (last visited
Oct. 16, 2018). As Earth is of limited size with limited resources, additional births will
eventually need some of the same resources now used by the living. See Rachel Becker, World
Population Expected to Reach 9.7 Billion by 2050, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (July 31, 2015),
https://www.news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/07/world-population-expected-to-reach-9-7billion-by-2050/. Granted, an American child may survive at the expense of an African child,
which would indicate more of a problem with distribution than with scarcity. See Anne Roback
Morse & Steven W. Mosher, Debunking the Myth of Overpopulation, POPULATION RES. INST.
(Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.pop.org/debunking-the-myth-of-overpopulation/. However, we have
a global population problem, and with rights to life and equity, we need global limits on
reproduction. See Becker, supra. Those limits are likely to require more effective approaches
to population control than are currently employed in some places.
430 Humanity is at increasing risk of doing irreversible damage to the life support system of
the planet. See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 167–68, 169, 178. As
humanity began exceeding the planet’s limits before 1992, we are clearly deep in the process of
finding the brink of collapse. See DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., BEYOND THE LIMITS 2 (1992).
431 DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 58.
432 See id. at 22.
433 See id. at 17.
434 See DIAMOND, supra note 22, at 313.
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population,435 the right to terminate early pregnancies may
nevertheless be needed to help protect the rights of lives in being.436
No one should be driven from this Earth by the procreational
liberties of others.437 Considerations include population control as
well as the health of the mother, the prospective health of that future
human, and the ability to feed, educate, and house her.438 Once we
come into this world, we each have the right to be treated with
respect.439
Collectively, humanity needs a “respect for the sanctity of life.”440
We need a way, deep in the law, to remember that life is sacred–and
to protect it from significant risk.441 Life has an intrinsic value.442
We should not be protected while in the womb, and fair game once
we come out.443 Life must consistently prevail over risks embedded
in liberty. But, as the planet overpopulates, we increasingly face in

435 If humanity drops, from an estimated high of nine billion in 2050 to, say, a world
population of five billion, then, assuming we have not eroded our environment too far, we
should probably be able to take measures to make sure that we don’t drop far below four billion.
See World Clocks, supra note 429. Humanity needs to make sure that we do not crash our
population. See Becker, supra note 429. Secondly, we need to reevaluate previous calculations
to see if they remain sufficiently accurate to accommodate the full (within a margin of safety)
functioning of the planet’s life support system. See id.
436 See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 57–58.
437 See id. at 170. Reproductive rights come with social responsibilities to limit behavior.
See id. We have a duty not to overpopulate and thereby harm other people. See also DIAMOND,
supra note 22, at 291, 294, 299 (describing the success of population limits in Japan and the
Pacific island of Tikopia).
438 See Granholm, supra note 138.
439 See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 84.
440 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 350 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Carey v. Population Serv.’s Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 715 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)).
441 See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 74, 75 (“Something is sacred or inviolable when its
deliberate destruction would dishonor what ought to be honored.”).
442 See id. at 70.
443 See Rosemary Radford Reuther, ‘Consistent Life Ethic’ Is Inconsistent, NAT’L CATH. REP.
(Nov. 17, 2006), https://www.thefreelibrary.com/%27Consistent+life+ethic%27+is+inconsistent
.-a0155404604. In support of her position, Professor Reuther elaborates:

Where is the bishop who would say that soldiers who massacre civilians are
excommunicated? Where are bishops who would suggest that those who manufacture
nuclear weapons are excommunicated and should repent by leaving such forms of
employment? There were two Mexican bishops some years ago who declared that torturers
were excommunicated, but they were maverick leftists whose views were unsupported by
the rest of the bishops and by the Vatican. In short, Catholicism speaks softly and carries
no stick when it comes to untimely and unjust death after birth.
Id.
Instead, Professor Reuther says, “Catholic ethics needs to be somewhat more
consequentialist about the decisions of women to reproduce or not reproduce children and more
principled when it comes to defending life after birth and sanctioning those whose policies are
causing untimely death.” Id.
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the arena of abortion, a conflict between two rights to life, potential
life versus lives in being.444
As Americans, we may feel secure that we are not overpopulating
the Earth.445 However, Professor Edward O. Wilson sees reason for
us to have an uneasy conscience: “for the rest of the world to reach
United States level of consumption with existing technology would
require four more planet Earths.”446
American per capita
consumption is out of balance with the resources of the planet.447
Certainly, we could cut consumption, but it is foreseeable that we
would also need to reduce our population.448 And as humanity’s
corporations, many based in the United States, continue their efforts
to maximize short-term profits, they drive us deeper into
environmental overshoot.449 Global risk to billions only increases.450
Here we are considering the possibility of facing inversions on a
massive scale. The death of billions through gross negligence should
not hold higher moral ground than the systematic slaughter of six
million individuals of the Jewish descent.451 Certainly genocide is not
to be condoned. However, gross negligence causing significant risk
of loss of life for over a thousand times as many people should not be
condoned either.452
Each of us is at risk, and together in
environmental overshoot, we are all at greater risk. We don’t know
the risk well, as we have never seen it before. The risk is now global
– on top of all the old local risks. Neither clumsiness nor delay are
good ideas.

See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 73.
Karen Kaplan, Americans Keep Having Fewer Babies as U.S. Birthrates Hit Some Record
Lows, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-us-birt
h-rate-20170630-htmlstory.html (“In 2016, the total fertility rate for American women was
1,818 births per 1,000 women [, far short of the 2,100 replacement rate] . . . . The U.S. has been
missing that mark since 1971 (though the country’s population has grown due to
immigration).”).
446 See WILSON, supra note 346, at 150.
447 See id.
448 See id. at 30.
449 See id. at 166; see also James Rainey, Earth Overshoot Day: Humans Are Using Earth’s
Resources Faster than Ever, Group Warns, NBC NEWS (July 21, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.co
m/news/us-news/earth-overshoot-day-humans-are-using-earth-s-resources-faster-n892996
(“Created by the Global Footprint Network environmental nonprofit, Earth Overshoot Day
estimates the point in the year when humanity has consumed more natural resources and
created more waste than Earth can replace or safely absorb in a year.”).
450 See WILSON, supra note 346, at 189. Wilson’s concern about risk to 800 million poor
people does not adequately reflect the risk to all of humanity.
451 See Didier Pollefeyt, Preface, in HOLOCAUST AND NATURE 10, 11 (Didier Pollefeyt ed.,
2003); Margaret M. DeGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal
Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 1402 (2009).
452 See Pollefeyt, supra note 451, at 11.
444
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Let’s test this idea out as a thought experiment on a global scale.
If humanity were to make a concerted effort to survive, it would touch
on every culture.453 As a result, some of the most basic rights in any
culture could become a flashpoint for efforts to save lives.454 For
example, the secular law of life-saving may come into conflict with
religion.455 Indeed, although David Hodge sees ranking human
rights as problematic, he concedes that “religious freedom has long
been considered one of the most basic rights.”456 Kevin Hasson sees
religion as “the prototypical human right.”457 Religion is a basic
cultural right or liberty, a fundamental right.458 It deserves and gets
great deference in many venues.459
Now, consider an inversion. Should religion be allowed to displace
life itself? The premillennialist Christian aim is “the end” of life as
we know it.460 If an aim for the end is implemented as environmental
policy, the religious prophesy of the end can become self-fulfilling.
The direction to populate without limit could be another example
of religion overriding the right to life, as such activity by millions of
adherents stands a significant risk of contributing to local and even
global collapse and mass death.461 There are many ways in which
453 See DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 76–77 (“It is an inarticulate, unchallenged, almost
unnoticed, but nevertheless absolute premise of our political and economic planning that the
human race must survive and prosper.”).
454 See id.
455 See id. at 92.
456 David R. Hodge, Advocating for the Forgotten Human Right: Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights − Religious Freedom, 49 INT’L SOC. WORK 431, 432 (2006).
457 Kevin J. Hasson, Religious Liberty and Human Dignity: A Tale of Two Declarations, 27
HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 81, 89 (2003) (“Religious freedom is not merely one of many rights, but
the prototypical human right.”); see generally Kendal Davis, Note, The Veil That Covered
France’s Eye: The Right to Freedom of Religion and Equal Treatment in Immigration and
Naturalization Proceedings, 10 NEV. L.J. 732, 747 (2010) (discussing religious liberty in
international law).
458 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
459 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024
(2017) (finding that qualified religious entities may not be denied a public benefit based on
their religious character); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (holding that the Arkansas
Department of Correction’s grooming policy violated an inmate’s right to grow facial hair in
accordance with his religious beliefs); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236 (denying state’s attempts to
punish religious families who refused to send their children to public or private school and
chose instead a vocational faith-based education).
460 See Alan Wolfe, The Grounds of Courage, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 13, 2011),
https://newrepublic.com/article/81378/dietrich-bonhoeffer-pastor-martyr-spy
(“[A]
premillennialist, or one who believe[s] that Christians should withdraw from efforts to improve
the world around them and wait instead for the harsh cleansing that would come when Jesus
returned to earth and discovered how unfaithful his presumptive followers had been to his
teachings.”). Among the problems here are: (1) support for the disregard of environmental law
and policy; (2) a disregard of the rights to life of everyone else on the planet; and (3) a disregard
for the rights of others to future procreation.
461 See, e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 22, at 107, 169, 248, 320 (identifying Easter Island, Maya,
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religion could encourage harmful behavior.462 Fortunately, most
religions mean well.463
Religions that seek “the end of times” or support the
overpopulation of the planet constitute a significant risk, especially
for the behavior they support.464 However, the Due Process Clauses
impose duties on government, not on religion, especially since the
passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.465 Some
duties may be misplaced.466
Whether liberty is speech, religion, the right to bear arms for a
militia, or peaceable assembly, a new approach, prioritizing the
protection of life, is called for. Such an approach would prioritize life
over other rights.
Let’s not forget the border wall.467 Consider, those escaping
violence in Central America; many families have been sent running
for their lives.468 Since long before the Statue of Liberty was built,
people have come to this country for a new life, and new chance.469

Norse Greenland, and Rwanda as cultures that overstressed local resources resulting in severe
local human population contractions). Cultural behavior, related to religion, played a role in
the decline of Norse Greenland. See id. at 248. Further, in the overpopulation of Rwanda,
where as a culture, there is a “low demand” for family planning and “about [fifty] percent of the
population is [pronatalist] Catholic.” John F. May et al., Family Planning in Rwanda: Status
and Prospects, 21 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 20, 21 (1990). Another forty percent of Rwandans are
Protestant or Adventist, with the former generating even less demand for family limitation.
See Dieudonné Muhoza Ndaruhuye et al., Demand and Unmet Need for Means of Family
Limitation in Rwanda, 35 INT’L PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 122, 123 (2009).
462 See Gary Gutting, How Religion Can Lead to Violence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/08/01/opinion/how-religion-can-lead-to-violence.html.
463 See, e.g., Michael Lipka, Muslims and Islam: Key Findings in the U.S. and Around the
World, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslim
s-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/ (finding that Muslims worldwide
hold an overwhelming negative opinion of the terror organization the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant); Andy McDonald, The Inspiring Acts of These Religious Figures Will Restore Your
Faith In . . . Faith, HUFFINGTON POST (June 4, 2014, 11:08 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.co
m/2014/06/04/inspiring-religious-acts_n_5360489.html (highlighting cases of religious
tolerance and genericity across the globe).
464 See Glenn Scherer, Christian-Right Views Are Swaying Politicians and Threatening the
Environment, GRIST (Oct. 28, 2004), https://grist.org/article/scherer-christian/.
465 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb−2000bb-4 (2018).
466 See Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is A Burden: Protecting “Third Parties” in
Religious Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433, 491−92 (2014).
467 See Ron Nixon & Linda Qiu, Trump’s Evolving Words on the Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/us/politics/trump-border-wall-immigration.html.
468 See id.
469 See U.S. Immigration Before 1965, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/immigration
/u-s-immigration-before-1965 (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). For legitimate asylum seekers, The
Statue of Liberty is truly The Statue of Life, for without asylum, there is a reasonable fear of
death. See Marisa Peñaloza, Denied Asylum, But Terrified to Return Home, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Jul. 20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/20/630877498/denied-asylum-but-terrified-to-retu
rn-home.

PRESERVING LIFE BY RANKING RIGHTS

2018/2019]

Preserving Life By Ranking Rights

12/3/2018 4:48 PM

217

The United States was here for our forefathers.470 Has this country
changed so much that we need to remove The Statue of Liberty?
Unfortunately, the flow of people cannot go on indefinitely. While
some may fear culture clash, others have concerns with
environmental impact of all of those additional Americans.471 In the
short run, the Constitution should require the protection of life over
the governmental interest in stopping the liberty of (or protecting our
country from) law-abiding legitimate asylum seekers. Governmental
action should protect lives first.472 We ought to have a liberal reading
of the requirements for asylum or refugee status.473
B. Why Inversions Occur
Why do rights and interests in property and liberty sometimes
seem to trump rights to life even though the interest in underlying
rights to life is widely acknowledged to be more important? The
answer appears to be self-interest.474 Each of us must have some
minimal amount of self-interest or we do not eat and we do not stay
alive.475 However, economists have refined self-interest and put it on
See U.S. Immigration Before 1965, supra note 469.
See Howard F. Chang, The Environment and Climate Change: Is International Migration
Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 341, 348 (2010).
472 See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 513 (1991). If humans over-populate Central
America, the flow will continue. See Estimated Number of Illegal Immigrants in the U.S. in
2012, by Country of Origin (in 1,000), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/269365/orig
in-of-illegal-immigrants-in-the-us/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) (demonstrating that the majority
of illegal immigrants entering the U.S. are from Central America). In the longer term, it is in
all our interests to reduce human population pressures and demands on the environment in
much of Central America (and in many other parts of the world). In part, we need to do that
by slowing reproduction with incentives for birth control. See Malcolm Potts & Martha
Campbell, Foreign Policy: Without Birth Control, Planet Doomed, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 11,
2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/05/11/136201025/foreign-policy-without-birth-control-planetdoomed. Through population control, many of those currently migrating from Central America
and Africa would be better able to experience the lives they want without having to leave their
homes. See Population and Wellbeing, POPULATION MATTERS, https://www.populationmatter
s.org/documents/population_wellbeing.pdf 1 (last visited Oct. 20, 2018) (“[T]here is clear
evidence that quality of life declines with population growth.”). Of course, this notion rests on
the protection of human rights as a requirement for the Central American and human future.
473 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012); 22 U.S.C. § 6472 (2012).
474 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2 (2013) (demonstrating that some states, such as
Indiana, allow individuals to place their own interest in economic well-being above criminals
underlying right to life even when there is no threat to their person, only their property); Debbie
Schipp, ‘We Loot Or We Die of Hunger’: Starving Venezuelans Steal, Kill, to Eat, REUTERS (Jan.
23, 2018), https://www.news.com.au/finance/economy/world-economy/we-loot-or-we-die-of-hun
ger-starving-venezuelans-steal-kill-to-eat/news-story/30e1122ebd174c9b8f5b971f0801f2d5
(demonstrating that in extreme circumstances, individuals will violate the property rights of
others to ensure their own interests in living).
475 See Schipp, supra note 474.
470
471
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the steroids of maximization.476
And for liberty interests,
conservative religious interpretations provide other examples of selfinterest.477
We begin with property. Economists are trained in neo-classical
economic theory to maximize profits, income, and wealth.478 And
they have carried it too far.479 This is recognized in the literature of
the field of criminal justice.480 Such maximization has become
embedded in our culture and it has gone way beyond theory to include
deviant actions.481 Consider this definition of maximization from the
book Greed is Good:
Maximization includes the simultaneous utilization of
legitimate and illegitimate means in pursuit of the American
Dream. That is, people engage in maximization when they
violate the law (or engage in deviant behaviors) in the context
of work (a form of conformity). Since most forms of fraud are
committed in the context of work, it is a perfect example of
maximization.482
Such maximization focuses on individual well-being at the expense
of the group and the common good. Fraud itself may not kill, but
other forms or systems of greed can have adverse impacts on health
and can kill.483 Greed is self-interest that harms another.484 Greed
is then the driving force when property interests take lives.485 And
See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 223–25.
See Hasson, supra note 457, at 89 (demonstrating that individuals’ self-interest in
freedom of religion is often considered one of the most basic human rights similar to that of life
and ownership of property).
478 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 815, 816
(1990).
479
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982) (“[M]anagers not only may but also should
violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.”).
480 See MATTHEW ROBINSON & DANIEL MURPHY, GREED IS GOOD: MAXIMIZATION AND ELITE
DEVIANCE IN AMERICA 93, 126 (2009) (“[C]orporate capitalism has gone way too far as it is, and
much of the profit that has been generated in our current economy is literally built on the
property and lives of innocent Americans.”).
481 See id. at 81.
482 See id. at 81–82.
483 See id. at 94, 95, 107 (demonstrating that elite crimes involve dangerous and “defective”
products that harm the public health, including unhealthy foods, dangerous cars, and
unhealthy tobacco).
484 See Wesley Gant, Greed Is Not Good (But Self-Interest Is), VALUES & CAPITALISM,
http://www.valuesandcapitalism.com/greed-is-not-good-but-self-interest-is/; see also Draper,
Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9 at 225 (“[H]armful selfishness is greed[.]”).
485 See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 323, at 1565; see also Draper, Neo-Classical
Economics, supra note 9, at 225–26 (“Using unrestricted CBA to make life or death decisions
476
477
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when law protects those property interests, a deadly inversion
occurs.486
Liberty interests can also take lives.487 Whether the liberty
interest at stake relates to cultural norm in religion (e.g.,
encouraging overpopulation or a desire for “the end”) or to some other
activity (such as yelling “fire” in a crowded theater), an interest in
liberty can be used as a justification for behavior that foreseeably
increases risks to innocent lives and health of those who have not
consented to that risk.488 The selfish desire to comply with religious
doctrine (to get to Heaven) at the expense of other lives shows that
self-interest can come in many forms.489 Whether religion or some
other cultural force instructs you to engage in significantly risky
behavior, you are still placing life at risk and you are committing a
wrong.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RANKING
If the order—life, liberty, and property—from the Due Process
Clauses is treated in lexical priority, significant risks to life no longer
come into conflict with other rights. We can more easily and
effectively resolve difficult questions of significant risk of both local
and global importance.490 If life and health are treated as related
priorities, law can effectively protect life when rights to life or health
come into conflict with liberty or property rights.491
The ranking can be implemented in both Constitutional and

places greed-based efficiency on a par with life itself.”).
486 See Sabbeth, supra note 18, at 1501 (“Substantive and procedural rights often rank basic
human needs below property rights.”); see also Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9
at 225–26 (“Greed alone can kill.”).
487 See e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 170; Wolfe, supra note 460.
488 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); DWORKIN, supra note 39, at 170;
Wolfe, supra note 460.
489 See Wolfe, supra note 460 (“Christians should withdraw from efforts to improve the world
around them and wait instead for the harsh cleansing that would come when Jesus returned
to earth.”).
490 An example of an important local matter would be the availability of clean water. See
Keating, supra note 100, at 685. Global examples include too much overall pollution (e.g.,
greenhouse gases), too much overall consumption (e.g., fossil fuels, causing those greenhouse
gases), or too large a population (for the planet to feed and support without harming its life
support system). See MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 346, at xiv; Joel Achenbach, Scientists:
Human Activity Has Pushed Earth Beyond Four of Nine “Planetary Boundaries”, WASHINGTON
POST (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/scientists-hum
an-activity-has-pushed-earth-beyond-four-of-nine-planetary-boundaries/2015/01/15/f52b61b69b5e-11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html.
491 The ranking’s implementation might even help our government stay in better compliance
with international criminal law by aiming to avoid crimes against humanity.
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regulatory contexts. It can not only provide order to Due Process,
ranking can help organize and prioritize administrative rulemaking.
In litigation, the Due Process right could arise as a substantive
claim or defense to an action by a governmental entity.492 The Due
Process Clauses apply to actions of federal, state, and local
governmental entities.493 Strands of the ranking’s principles already
exist in many places throughout our law.494 Implementing the
ranking merely pulls those principles together and solidifies them,
giving government the duty to prevent significant risks to life and
health in the face of liberty and property interests.
Implementation employs a decision process that begins with the
threshold question of what counts as a risk to life.495 Only risks that
are both foreseeable and significant qualify for treatment.496
Qualifying risks should be identified in a serial operation, looking
first to risks to life and health.497 Next, would be risks to liberties
and property. This is an identification and sorting process, with
attempts to identify risks and channel protections for life.
The same analysis would apply in the regulatory rulemaking
process. Risks to life, liberty, and property would be sorted by
searching first for significant risks to life and health, those risks
being special targets for regulation. Let us stick with life and health
for now but also recognize that regulation could also be used to
protect liberty and property rights.
Next, we attempt to decide whether the activity that is the
potential subject of regulation is one that we can live without. If so,
we would employ safety regulation, using the safe level of risk
imposition as the standard, akin that standard in the Clean Air Act

492 The matter of standing (to sue) would need revision to enable the law to address all
significant risks to the life support system of the planet. See Bibas, supra note 376, at 337–38.
493 See Fundamentals of Constitutional Law for Legal Services and Pro Bono Practitioners:
Due Process and Equal Protection, CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & CONST. L. 1, 3 (Feb. 2014),
https://www.centerforhumanrights.org/PDFs/3-6-14_2014ConLawDueProcessManual.pdf.
494 See Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa 1971) (holding that one cannot defend
unoccupied property with deadly force); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (recognizing
the need to save a life permits trespass).
495 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 309; Sir Crispin Tickell, Environment on the
Edge, 59 MERCER L. REV. 719, 728 (2008).
496 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 371 (“If the risks are significant and morally
comparable to the risk of death in global climate change or environmental avalanche, then we
would apply feasible risk reduction. If these activities are not morally comparable to the risk
of death, then we should limit the activity to the point of comparability.”).
497 See id. at 347; Serial Operation, THE FREE DICTIONARY,
https://www.thefreedictionary.com/serial+operation (“[T]he sequential execution of operations
one after another.”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
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Amendments of 1990,498 to eradicate risk to life and health to the
point of insignificance.499
If we could not live without the activity, if our lives or liberty
demanded it, we would instead utilize feasible risk reduction, akin to
the standard employed in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970,500 to reduce the risk as much as possible either to the point of
insignificance501 or to the point of inelastic demand,502 whichever
comes first.
Of course, additional filters might be added, but the primary focus
with ranking in the regulatory context is on filters for risks to life and
health.
A. Protection Against All Risks?
What represents a risk to life? If we look for all risks, we cannot
function. We would be overwhelmed by the chaos of endless costly
and time-consuming chases. The need for human liberty requires
that we accept some level of background risk. Therefore, qualifying
risks must be both foreseeable and significant.
The foreseeability requirement is borrowed from tort law.503 In tort
law, even when the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff, the
requirement that risks be foreseeable protects defendants from
liability for risks that were not foreseeable at the time of injury.504
We must be able to foresee and discuss these risks in advance.505 The
risks cannot be merely theoretical.506 There must be some practical
aspect.507 Advances in science have opened new windows into the
foreseeability of many risks.508
Significance is the other requirement.509 How does one define
significance? Gregory Keating delves into this in discussing use of

See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2012).
See Keating, supra note 100 at 720–21.
500 See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012).
501 See Keating, supra note 100, at 687.
502 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 346.
503 See Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss:
An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 665, 702 (1994).
504 See id.
505 See id. at 674–75.
506 See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1220 (Cal. 1997).
507 See Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 291–92 (Cal. 2016) (quoting Bigbee v. Pac.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947, 952 (Cal. 1983)).
508 See Betsy J. Grey, The Future of Emotional Harm, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2605, 2646 (2015)
(“As courts began to move away from the physical manifestation rule, they cited a number of
factors in this shift . . . such as advances in science.”).
509 See Keating, supra note 100, at 661.
498
499
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the safety and feasibility standards to press precaution beyond the
He sees the possibility of the
point of cost-justification.510
determination being quantitative, qualitative, or a mix of both.511
Significance is more than just a theory. Keating notes two required
aspects of significance: “First, the risk must be salient—it must be
distinguishable from other risks associated either with the activity in
question or with social life in general. It must stand out among its
fellow risks.”512 However, the result must also be a concern: “Second,
to be significant, when a risk ripens into harm it must inflict a severe
injury, a devastating injury, the kind of injury that seriously impairs
ordinary life.”513 This analysis applied at the group level would
involve foreseeable risk of significant harm to a sufficiently sizeable
group or percentage of a population.514
The principle should be applied only when there is significant risk
to life or health. Risks to interests in life and health outrank liberty
and property interests, but only to the point of insignificance of risk.
Significance is a requirement for the operation of both risk filters, the
safety standard and feasible risk reduction.515
Relying on Professor Keating’s work, I point out elsewhere that
humanity needs more precaution than that provided by cost

See id. at 684.
See id. at 694.
512 Id. at 693.
513 Id.
514 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part) (“[A] government practice or statute which restricts ‘fundamental rights’ or which
contains ‘suspect classifications’ is to be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if
it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive
alternative is available.”). If that group is limited by race, religion or other suspect
classifications, actions by governmental entities are subjected to strict scrutiny under Equal
Protection analysis. See id. And if a group is limited by nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion,
governmental and private actors with specific intent to inflict harm risk the invocation of
international criminal law through the genocide convention. See Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention]. Article II of the Genocide Convention defines the crime of genocide as follows:
510
511

[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id. at 280.
515 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 345, 346–47.
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justification.516 However, we cannot subject all risks to special
precaution beyond the point of cost justification.517 Keating suggests
that it behooves us to “eliminate or feasibly reduce only significant
risks of devastating injury[:] . . . a significance requirement is
necessary to prevent both safe and feasible risk reduction from
inflicting harms to our liberty greater than the harms that
insignificant risks of devastating injury inflict on our security.”518 All
risks to life and health would not qualify for these restrictions. “The
imposition of insignificant—but real—risks of devastating injury is
so pervasive that the elimination of insignificant risks of devastating
injury would cripple our freedom of action.”519 One could respond
that mass death is significant if anything is.520 Collapse is
foreseeable.521
The risks of human collapse are sufficiently foreseeable, even
probable, and the United States is well advised to take them into
account in policy discussion and design. We should attempt to protect
not only the lives of individuals but also all lives in our community of
interest.
We will encounter the inevitable risk-risk tradeoffs.522 With the
ranking in place, issues of life would be weighed only against other
issues of life.523 We will inevitably encounter the weighing of the lives
of the group against the life of an individual.524 This is known as the

See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 24445; Keating, supra note 100.
See Keating, supra note 100, at 699.
518 Id. at 661.
519 Keating, supra note 100, at 661.
520 Significance is not a question of probability but a question of how bad it would be if it
happened. See id. at 697. This then justifies an investigation into probability and arc, which
can then lead to further investigations of causation and correction. See id.
521 See EDWARD O. WILSON, HALF-EARTH: OUR PLANET’S FIGHT FOR LIFE 1, 65–66 (2016).
Seeing “odds . . . no better than fifty-fifty that our present civilisation on Earth will survive to
the end of the present century,” Professor Martin Rees wonders whether the planet will
stabilize or die. MARTIN REES, OUR FINAL HOUR: A SCIENTIST’S WARNING: HOW TERROR,
ERROR, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER THREATEN HUMANKIND’S FUTURE IN THIS CENTURY—
ON EARTH AND BEYOND 8 (2003).
522 See Daniel C. Esty, What’s the Risk in Risk?, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 603, 603 (1996).
523 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 391.
524 See, e.g., Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, 5
OXFORD REV. 5–6, 9 (1967) (“[W]e could not spare the whole resources of a ward for one
dangerously ill individual when ambulances arrive bringing in the victims of a multiple
crash.”).
516
517
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trolley problem.525 Although in the scenario someone will die,526 it is
important to remember that constitutional rights apply to
everyone.527
B. The Means: Rank the Basic Rights
What should we do to rectify inversions that place our interests in
life at significant risk? We should recognize that those interests are
rights—and that we each have a duty to actively protect the rights of
individuals and the larger group. In the process, we face questions
of qualification (emergency; significant risk),528 filtering (fungibility
and incommensurability),529 and general operation (substantive
partitioning, weighting, and substantive due process).530
What follows are some observations about this (not so) new means
of protecting life, first, followed by safe liberty and property. The
ranking of basic rights is an appropriate emergency measure for
situations in which individuals, groups, and even the human species
find themselves at significant risk. However, as a constitutional
principle of interpretation for language long a part of our
Constitution, a declaration of emergency is unnecessary to protect
lives.531 The significance requirement for risk serves as the
functional equivalent of an emergency.532
Ranking is a form of conceptual partitioning.533 Ranking solves
problems of incommensurability.534 It could operate as an entirely
new substantive implementation of the Due Process Clause. As we
will see, in necessary and appropriate cases, this administrative
approach with the Constitution can be adjusted with feasible risk
525 See id. at 8. The trolley problem, an ethical brainteaser involving choice and death to
others (whether to throw a switch to have a runaway trolley kill one person or not throw the
switch and allow several others to die), was first posed by Philippa Foot in 1967. Id.; see Judith
Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395 (1985); Corey Doctorow, The
Problem With Self-Driving Cars: Who Controls the Code?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2015, 7:00
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/23/the-problem-with-self-driving-cars
-who-controls-the-code.
526 See Foot, supra note 524, at 8; Thomson, supra note 525, at 1395; Doctorow, supra note
525.
527 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
528 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 44–45; Keating, supra note 100, at 661, 697.
529 See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 239.
530 See id. at 237; Balganesh & Katz, supra note 27, at 3–4, 7, 12.
531 The Due Process Clauses of the Constitution broadly protects life. See U.S.
CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
532 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 43; Keating, supra note 100, at 657–58, 697.
533 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 369–70; Keating, supra note 100, at 724.
534 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 333; Keating, supra note 100, at 709–10; Cass
R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 237, 238 (2010).
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reduction.535
Feasible risk reduction and the ranking of rights operate well
together.536 Ranking recognizes the incommensurability of the three
categories while protecting life (and health) first, ahead of liberty and
property.537 Together, ranking and feasible risk reduction can better
protect millions of innocent and vulnerable American men, women,
and children. All of us. Our incommensurable lives would be
protected to the extent both economically and technologically
feasible.
C. Should Ranking Require an Emergency?
Although Juan de Lugo required an emergency for the
implementation of his ranking scheme,538 I would argue that an
emergency is no longer needed to justify the ranking of basic rights
with the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution of the United States
of America.
First, we don’t need to declare an emergency to protect these rights.
The rights expressed in the Due Process Clause, life, liberty, and
property, are already broad categories subject to constitutional
protection.539 Each of these rights is precious. Lexical ordering, or
ranking, protects first that which is most precious.540
Secondly, if, as a nation, we can achieve the lifesaving benefits of
ranking these rights while experiencing fewer emergency situations,
we are better off.541 Emergencies bear additional significant risk and

See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 392.
See id. at 390–91.
537 See id. at 391.
538 See CHAFUEN, supra 39, at 45.
539 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
540 See CHAFUEN, supra 39, at 45 (stating that a person’s life or liberty is ranked higher than
another’s risk of losing material goods).
541 The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season (with massive hurricanes striking Texas, Florida, the
Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico) is rather convincing in its connections to global warming and
man-made risk. See Cale Jaffe, Melting the Polarization Around Climate Change Politics, 30
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 455, 494–95 (2018); R.A. Pielke Jr. et al., Hurricanes and Global Warming,
86 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1571, 1572, 1574 (Nov. 2005); Chris Dolce, For First
Time Since 2005, Four Hurricanes Make U.S. Landfalls in One Season, THE WEATHER
CHANNEL (Oct. 8, 2017), https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/2017-10-07-four-us-hurric
ane-landfalls-nate-maria-irma-harvey. With global warming, we have created our own
emergency, one of many significant risks now faced by our species. See Martin J. LaLonde, The
Role of Risk Analysis in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, 15 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 215, 217 (1993) (stating the risks created by global warming). See Draper, Neo-Classical
Economics, supra note 9, at 165, for the variety of significant risks to our species and its life
support system.
535
536
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hardship to innocent and un-consenting lives.542
Thirdly, technology may have changed the calculus. For Lugo, an
emergency justified the uncompensated taking of another’s private
property for escape.543 However, in Lugo’s time transportation did
not have locks, punch-codes, and serial numbers.544 Property laws
and protections are now much more robust and developed than they
were in the seventeenth century.545 Having the benefit of these extra
property rights carries with it a duty to assist those with personal
emergencies.546 Such assistance is funded through a combination of
taxation and charity.547 Tax laws and government aid should be used
to effectuate the protection of life in a catastrophe.548 The interests
of the needy are so great as to support the creation and maintenance
of institutions to assist those with personal hardship.549
Finally, we are negligent to wait for an emergency to justify taking
lifesaving measures. Lives count, and it is best if we protect them
from significant risk before they are in emergency situations.
Knowingly allowing individuals, groups, or even our nation to fall
into a foreseeable emergency seems more like gross negligence, as
this only increases risk and causes additional trauma.550

See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 333, 391.
See CHAFUEN, supra 39, at 45.
544 See id. at 44 (establishing Lugo was alive from 1593–1660).
545 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 734
(2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Keith H. Hirokawa, Property as Capture and Care, 74 ALB. L.
REV. 175, 182–83 (2010/11); see also G.E. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of “Property” in
Seventeenth-Century England, 86 PAST & PRESENT 87, 91–92 (1980) (discussing the meaning
of property in the seventeenth century).
546 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 43.
547 See id.; see, e.g., Kristen Dale, Note, The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Power
Players in International and Domestic Natural Disaster Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
111, 121–22 (2016).
548 See e.g., Veronique Bruggeman et al., Insurance Against Catastrophe: Government
Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185,
190, 191 (2012) (discussing catastrophe bonds and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA)).
549 See e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 558 (1999) (discussing
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program). These institutions could be
public or private, secular or religious. As the 2017 hurricane season proved, there is often a
need for lifesaving help. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA
After-Action Report, FEMA, 1 (July 12, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/153174
3865541-d16794d43d3082544435e1471da07880/2017FEMAHurricaneAAR.pdf.
550 See David Alexander, Disaster and Recovery Planning for Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NAT. HAZARD SCI. 1, 8 (Sept. 2015), http://naturalhaz
ardscience.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.001.0001/acrefore9780199389407-e-12?print=pdf.
542
543
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D. Employing Conceptual Partitioning for Persistence
Ranking basic rights, as a tool of conceptual partitioning, would
assist in the continuation of human life. Ranking separates or
partitions rights, Professors Shyamkrishna Balganesh and Leo Katz
connect two concepts to show that the tool of conceptual partitioning
will aid in the search for persistence.551 Conceptual partitioning is a
combination of “partitioning” and “conceptual sequencing” developed
by Bruce Chapman.552 Persistence as a goal is important as it
provides unwavering support for some rights over others.553 “It is
that the quality of persistence is an aspirational ideal that the law
attempts to realize in different settings where there are competing
claims/rights, causing it to prioritize among them in different
ways.”554 Persistence can have different uses, depending upon
human goals.555 We should use persistence to save lives.
Balganesh and Katz demonstrate a few different examples of
conceptual partitioning in their article, part of a volume honoring
Professor Wesley Hohfeld.556 In admiring his century-old theory that
focused on the distinction between in rem and in personam rights,557
they show Hohfeld’s work to be an exercise in partitioning.558 Such
partitioning keeps one kind of rights separate and distinct from
another.559
Balganesh and Katz view partitioning as a choice.560 They point
out that “the decision will be shaped by the way that the decisionmaker ‘conceptually partitions’ his choices and prioritizes the
criterion of decision-making,” an exercise that is qualitative yet
prioritized.561 Balganesh and Katz offer other examples of persistent
and non-persistent partitioning beyond property law: the law of libel,
products liability, and the case of intentional interference with

See Balganesh & Katz, supra note 27, at 7.
Id. at 3.
553 See id. at 12.
554 Id. at 3.
555 See id. at 3, 12.
556 See id. at 2.
557 See id. at 1. “[T]he antithetical pair of expressions, in personam and in rem, is constantly
being employed as a basis for classifying at least four distinct matters.” Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710,
714 (1917). The meanings may vary, but the two expressions are always different from each
other. They persist. See id.
558 See Balganesh & Katz, supra note 27, at 2.
559 See id. at 4.
560 See id.
561 See id. at 3, 5.
551
552
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contractual relations.562 Each of these examples involves a tort with
three parties.563 Their examples show that in some situations,
persistent rules can lead to an unjust result, and in some they can
help avoid one.564 Thus, we need to be careful about where we use
persistent rules.
Here are the basic rights for which persistent rules and protection
are required: life, liberty, and property. We must persistently rank
life first, or we will risk the deaths that derive from inversions with
liberty or property. If we want our lives to persist, we must protect
them with rules that persist.565
This is akin to Professor Harold Berman’s concept of using the law
to create “channels of cooperation.”566 We Americans—and we,
humanity—need to cooperate to able to survive. This invokes the
philosophy and psychology of survival, each a topic worthy of multivolume sets.567
E. A Solution to Problems of Incommensurability
American
law
has
enormous
challenges
with
incommensurability.568 Consider, for example, use of the value of
statistical life in cost-benefit analysis, which weighs a property right
expressed in dollars against the dollar value of statistical life (VSL)
expressed in lost lives.569 Those un-consenting random lives are lost,
say, to neurological diseases, immune disorders, emphysema, or
cancer, as they are unprotected by regulation.570 When most of us

See id. at 7, 8, 9, 10.
See id. at 8, 10.
564 See id. at 9, 10, 11.
565 The protection must be legal, moral (e.g., religion), and scientific. If all three areas of
human endeavor do not cooperate, humanity will be working against itself. See Paul H.
Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s
Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the United States and Minnesota
Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REV. 865, 872, 897, 898, 899 (2007).
566 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION
3 (1993).
567 See Amy L. Wax, Against Nature–On Robert Wright’s the Moral Animal, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 307, 313–14 (1996); MARK JABLONOWSKI, MANAGING HIGH-STAKES RISK: TOWARD A NEW
ECONOMICS FOR SURVIVAL 1, 2 (1st ed. 2009).
568 See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 26, at 825. For example, the use of neoclassical economics in American law and regulation is the source of many instances of
incommensurability. See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 207–09. Pollution
is a prime example. See id. at 207. The value of the additional profits on one side is
incommensurable with the resulting injuries to life and health on the other. See id. In economic
theory, such injuries may be seen as externalities. See id.
569 See Draper, Neo-Classical Economics, supra note 9, at 159, 160–61.
570 See id. at 197; see also Keating, supra note 100, at 694–95.
562
563
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think of our own life, we do not think in dollars – or in terms of
property. We are biological beings.
Two things are incommensurable when they are inherently
different and not comparable.571 For example, incommensurability
occurs when an economic activity, a property interest, is weighed
against harm to human health or life.572 The two competing interests
cannot align along the same unitary metric because some things
cannot be counted.573
However, our law can accommodate a flexible pair of standards
that vary in implementation based on elasticity of demand and
significance of risk.574 These are the safety and feasible risk
reduction standards.575 The standards work together to enable the
cooperation of multiple rights of different commensurabilities.576 We
recognize those commensurabilities by partitioning them and by
working first to reduce significant risks to life and health.577
We do not pay much attention to incommensurability in our
economic law right now.578 Many externalities, such as pollution,
appear to be unsolvable.579 Solutions do not fit with the underlying
economics, as neo-classical economics and utilitarianism require a
unitary metric.580 Statistical lives are priced, pollution is permitted,
and the stage is set.581 Years or decades later, millions suffer with
shortened lives.582 Many of those millions may not even reside in the
jurisdiction that allowed or benefitted from the harmful activity in
the first place.583
To fail to protect life, especially on a grand scale, would be a crime

See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 26, at 796.
See Keating, supra note 100, at 719. Life and health are immeasurable against property
and money, because values of life, liberty, and property are immeasurable against each other.
See id. These rights cannot be “fungible at some ratio of exchange;” given the risks to our life
support system, if the species is to survive, humanity must reject what Gregory Keating calls
the “idea of universal commensurability.” See id.
573 WILLIAM BRUCE CAMERON, INFORMAL SOCIOLOGY: A CASUAL INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIOLOGICAL THINKING 13 (1963) (“[N]ot everything that can be counted counts, and not
everything that counts can be counted.”).
574 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 346–47. Significance of risk is a qualitative
rather than quantitative assessment. See Keating, supra note 100, at 697.
575 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 303.
576 See id. at 303, 331, 332.
577 See id. at 339, 340.
578 See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 26, at 781.
579 See id. at 814.
580 See id. at 814, 815–16.
581 See id. at 835–36.
582 See Rowell & Wexler, supra note 132, at 501.
583 For example, the United States routinely values foreign lives at zero, by failing to
consider them in decisions to regulate. See id. at 528.
571
572
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against humanity.584 Fortunately, it is possible to solve problems of
incommensurability.585 To solve those problems, we will benefit by
restructuring the way we think about basic rights. Conveniently,
that restructuring may be accomplished through a conservative
judicial re-interpretation of current language based in Thomist and
natural law theory.586
F. A New Substantive Due Process?
We need a new interpretation of the Due Process Clause to protect
us from government action, but we should not return to the subjective
natural law analysis that did not work out well between 1887 and
1937.587 We need a new, more objective, ordered, substantive analysis
that protects life ahead of liberty and property.588
We need the new analysis to save lives and yet permit maximum
liberty to allow all Americans to live creative and satisfying lives. We
cannot live with a liberty that kills people, but we can succeed in
having plenty of liberty even if we protect life first. We cannot protect
all life all the time.589 The result would be total loss of liberty at the
hands of an oppressive state.590 We need clear rules with stated
limits designed to protect to a certain point.

584 The international criminal law invoked in the Nuremberg trials treated the violation of
the basic human right to life as a crime against humanity, without the invocation of statute,
treaty, or international declaration. See Matthew Lippman, The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 415,
427–28 (1998). The war crime trials were held before the adoption of the Genocide Convention.
See id. at 513. This same legal obligation, now a matter of precedent in international common
law, requires each of us to avoid crimes against humanity. See id. at 442. We must protect life.
However, if the protection of life is viewed as a new prohibition, beware: new criminal
prohibitions tend to backfire. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Law and Grace, 98 VA. L. REV. 367,
378 (2012).
585 See Sunstein, Incommensurability, supra note 26, at 808.
586 See Michael P. Zuckert, Do Natural Rights Derive From Natural Law?, 20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 695, 715–16 (1997).
587 See generally ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 40, at § 15.2 (“The economic, social, and
intellectual thought of the late nineteenth century persuaded the Court that it must do more
to protect business interests from encroaching governmental control. . . . By the turn of the
century the Court embraced the concept [of substantive due process] fully and was ready to use
it as a rationale for striking down legislation that attempted to restrain the freedom of
businesses to contract.”). We already have a history of changing interpretations of this clause
going back to the founding. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 281, at 428, 448, 452, 467.
588 See Walter Dellinger, Textualism and the Civil War Amendment: Remarks on Jeffrey
Rosen’s Paper, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1293 (1998) (arguing that the text of the Due
Process Clauses has an exclusively substantive composition rooted in the fact that an absence
of substantive restrictions on government renders procedural restrictions futile).
589 See Philip G. Peters, The State’s Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan to
Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 920 (1989).
590 See id.
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What is that point? For activities that we can live without (subject
to the safety standard) and for activities that we cannot live without
(subject to feasible risk reduction), that point occurs when risk is
rendered insignificant.591 Thus the constitutional protections of the
Due Process Clause work to protect life, liberty, and property while
tying in well with an administrative law that supports safety (e.g.,
clean air and clean water) and feasibility (e.g., occupational safety)
regulation.592
G. Extreme Cases
Separating life, liberty, and property with a lexical ordering works
relatively well until the theory encounters extreme cases at the
overlapping ends of the spectra of life, liberty, and property.593
Consider the hypothetical case of saving a single life at a cost of $10
trillion.594 For how long? Or consider the extreme expenses of endof-life care.595 Given Medicare’s well-known deficits,596 questions of
feasibility are likely in both cases.597
Here we link with the administrative constitution.598 Feasible
591 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 347–49, for more on the significance
requirement.
592 See Keating, supra note 100, at 686–88.
593 See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 525, at 1395–96.
594 Costs in that range would likely take other lives. If the marginal number of lives lost
would likely exceed the number of lives saved, we are unlikely to have feasibility. See id.
595 Spending on medical care in the last year of a patient’s life accounts for over one quarter
of Medicare program outlays. See David H. Howard et al., The Relationship Between Ex Ante
Mortality Risk and End-of-Life Medical Costs, 5 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y 37,
37 (2006).
596 See Patricia A. Davis, Medicare: Insolvency Projections, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS20946, 8 (2018).

From its inception, the HI Trust Fund has faced a projected shortfall. The insolvency date
has been postponed a number of times, primarily due to legislative changes that have had
the effect of restraining growth in program spending. The 2018 Medicare trustees’ report
projects that, under intermediate assumptions, the HI Trust Fund will become insolvent
in 2026, two years earlier than estimated in the prior year’s report.
Id. at summary.
597 See Elliot S. Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in
Medicare, 28 HEALTH AFF., W219, W223–24 (2009), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.137
7/hlthaff.28.2.W219.
598 We need to reinvent a more complete and safe version of the “transsubstantive
administrative law” noted by Jerry Mashaw. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 312 (2012). That administrative law needs to integrate with the
Constitution. It must slow the railroad of the majority: “Administration must respect rights,
often through elaborate procedural protections—even if respecting rights can derail effective
governance and inhibit political control of administration.” Id. at 315. This would hold true

PRESERVING LIFE BY RANKING RIGHTS

232

12/3/2018 4:48 PM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 82.1

reduction of significant risks can be implemented through public
health regulation.599 In a way, such regulations are already in place
with Medicare.600 Medicare regulations specify what is covered and
for what cost.601 HHS employees determine in advance the coverages
that are feasible.602 If they are not both technologically and
economically feasible, they are not approved.603 We need these limits
to protect our government, our collective enterprise, from the
especially for the express rights (especially life) of the Due Process Clause as well as rights of
equality rooted in the Equal Protection Clause.
599 See Int’l Rehab. Scis. Inc. v. Sebelius, 688 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2012).
600 See id.
601 Medicare regulations for diagnostic related groups (DRGs) establish standards for
approval and set payment limits for specific treatments for specific ailments:
HHS pays hospitals for acute inpatient care they provide to Medicare enrollees under the
Prospective Payment System (“PPS”). . . . Rather than pay hospitals for the actual costs
they incur in providing care to particular Medicare enrollees, PPS pays hospitals a fixed,
predetermined amount based on each patient’s category of illness. . . . These categories
are called Diagnostic Related Groups or DRGs. . . . Under PPS, HHS constructs a
standard nationwide cost rate, the ‘federal rate,’ based on the average operating costs of
inpatient hospital services, then assigns a weight to each DRG category of inpatient
treatment. . . . HHS determines a hospital’s final reimbursement per patient by
multiplying the patient’s DRG by the federal rate, after that rate has been ‘standardized’
by making adjustments based on a variety of factors.
Anna Jaques Hosp. v. Sebelius, 33 F. Supp. 3d 47, 50 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
Those “adjustments” are cost adjustments for the reimbursable costs of hospitals. See id. They
do not expressly include considerations of technological and economic feasibility. See id.
However, by announcing reimbursement amounts, Medicare’s system of payment functions as
a kind of pre-determined feasibility analysis; that which will be reimbursed has been
determined to be both technologically and economically feasible. See Int’l Rehab. Scis. Inc., 688
F.3d at 997.
602 See Anna Jaques Hosp., 33 F. Supp. 3d at 50.
603 See id.; Int’l Rehab. Scis. Inc., 688 F.3d at 997. Consider, e.g., medical devices:
A device is not “reasonable and necessary”—and thus is not eligible for Medicare
coverage—if it is:
•
Not “safe” and “effective”—that is, if the device has not “been proven safe and
effective based on authoritative evidence” or is not “generally accepted in the
medical community as safe and effective for the condition for which it is used”;
•
“[E]xperimental”—that is, “investigational”;
•
Not “[a]ppropriate” for the individual beneficiary’s needs; or
•
“[S]ubstantially more costly than a medically appropriate and realistically
feasible alternative pattern of care.”
Int’l Rehab. Scis. Inc., 688 F.3d at 997. See, for example, Criteria and Procedures for Making
Medical Services Coverage Decisions That Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg.
4302, 4303, 3404 (Jan. 30, 1989) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 400, 405); Criteria and Procedures
for Extending Coverage to Certain Devices and Related Services, 60 Fed. Reg. 48417,
48418(Sept. 19, 1995) (codified as 42 C.F.R. pt. 405, 411)), for additional information on the
requirements of the Medicare program. Technological feasibility is represented by the safe and
effective standard, and economic feasibility is express in the fourth listed requirement. Int’l
Rehab. Scis. Inc., 688 F.3d at 997.
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hypothetical $10 trillion patient–or merely dozens each costing a
billion.
If we were to implement a constitutional ranking of basic rights,
one could imagine cases where the cost of (an almost insignificant
amount of) life-saving could be astronomical.604 For relatively small
extensions to life or health, there could be enormous fiscal costs to
government.605 And as we are equal and equally entitled, and we all
use health services, we know that some costs will inevitably exceed
the bounds of feasibility.606
Feasible risk reduction regulation has steps: 1) Is the risk to life
both foreseeable and significant?; 2) If so, is the risk subject to safety
regulation?; 3) If not so subject, is the risk an extreme case involving
great loss of liberty or property that we, as a society, have decided to
protect instead with feasible risk reduction?; a) If so, is risk reduction
technologically feasible?; and then b) Is that risk reduction also
economically feasible?607 Where a risk to life or health is significant,
remaining significant risks would be reduced to the extent both
technologically and economically feasible.608 We should apply
feasible risk reduction analysis to cases of extreme financial cost to
society (for relatively insignificant loss of life or liberty) or extreme
loss of liberty as a cost for de minimis life-saving.609 Regulators
should reduce significant risk to lives, but for certain essential
activities they can only permit risk reduction (up to the point of
insignificance) that is both technologically and economically
feasible.610
Feasibility analysis would help connect the law of our Constitution

604

382.

See Masur & Posner, supra note 331, at 671–72; Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at

605 See JACK GINSBURG, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS WHILE PROMOTING THE BEST
POSSIBLE HEALTH OUTCOMES 14 (Amer. Coll. of Physicians ed. 2009), https://www.acponline.or
g/acp_policy/policies/controlling_healthcare_costs_2009.pdf; Neil McHugh et al., Extending Life
for People with a Terminal Illness: A Moral Right and an Expensive Death? Exploring Societal
Perspectives, BIOMED CENT. MED. ETHICS, Mar. 2015, at 2, 11, http://doi.org/10.1186/s12910015-0008-x; Tomas Philipson, Dying to Live: Why is Health Care So Valuable in the Face of
Death?, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomasphilipson/2015/08/06/dyingto-live-why-is-health-care-so-valuable-in-the-face-of-death/#2745ec175423.
606 See GINSBURG, supra note 605, at 10, 38; McHugh et al., supra note 605, at 13.
607 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 344; Keating, supra note 100, at 687. The safe
level of risk imposition protects life and health from activities (with significant risks) that can
be eliminated. See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 344. Here, we make a collective
decision to live without those activities. See id. See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 366,
367, for more on these steps and their implementation.
608 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 345–46.
609 See id. at 368.
610 See id. at 347.
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to the reality of our existence.611 The need for certain liberty or
property at some measure conflicts with risks to life (or health).612
For those risk-bearing activities with highly inelastic demand, we
must engage in those activities even though they may present some
significant risk to life and health.613 We should reduce those risks to
the extent technologically and economically feasible. Risk reduction
would save lives and health to the extent feasible.614
The problem with extreme cases is that they represent an
exception or override from the standard conceptual partitioning of
Due Process rights.615 Unless the exceptions are channeled, they
cannot occur with much frequency or they will erode the persistent
life-saving rule. As the protection of life and health are interests of
ultimate value, we must work to assure that any flexibility in our
rules and relevant behavior is not self-defeating. Exceptions must be
predictable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although one might see the ranking of basic rights as a triumph of
liberalism over libertarianism, there is something deeper at work
here.616 Many of us have a bad feeling that something is wrong with
the current global system.617 Either we cannot put our finger on it,
or we recognize the human emergency but feel powerless to do
something, anything, about it.618 We want to do the right thing. We
611 See Gregory C. Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town?, 91 S. CAL. L.
REV. 195, 218 (2018).
612 See, e.g., Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57, 77, 80 (C.P. 1995) (citing
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 487. U.S. 261, 282 n.10 (1990)) (demonstrating the conflict
in “right to die” cases between the right to life and the right to liberty); Claire O. Finkelstein,
On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of Self-Defense to Its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L.
REV. 1361, 1395 (1999) (noting inherent conflict in right to life and liberty interest in selfdefense).
613 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 343.
614 Id. at 343–44.
615 See CHAFUEN, supra note 10, at 45 (“These rights evolved to preserve life and liberty. In
extreme cases when these rights seem to be in contradiction, life and liberty should prevail.”).
616 Beware libertarianism which skews and limits the right to life by focusing primarily on
liberty with property (at the expense of the lives and health of the disempowered), arguably in
violation of international criminal law. See Stephen O’Hanlon, Equality, Entitlement, and
Efficiency: Dworkin, Nozick, Posner, and Implications for Legal Theory, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 31, 34–35 (2009). This work aims to help social-and life-scientific thought
triumph over neo-classical utilitarianism and anti-intellectualism.
617 See e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 22, at 8 (“We are much more conscious of environmental
damage now than we were a mere few decades ago.”).
618 See DIAMOND, supra note 22, at 436 (“Finally, even after a society has anticipated,
perceived, or tried to solve a problem, it may still fail for obvious possible reasons: the problem
may be beyond our present capacities to solve, a solution may exit but be prohibitively
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see cancer, and we see war; we see impoverishment, starvation, and
thirst; and we believe there must be a better way. We need a
meaningful way to express our concerns – and at the same time save
lives and preserve liberty and property rights. By ranking our basic
rights we can do both.
The object of this position is not to crush liberty or property rights
under the burdens of life. The object is to protect life, not against all
activities—but only those constituting significant risks. As I point
out elsewhere, liberty should give way to life considerations in
decision procedure only in the face of significant risk to life.619
Without the significance requirement, we would lose our necessary
liberty.620
This would be a step toward the transformation that humanity
needs to make, should we as a species decide to survive. Humanity
has lost its moral rudder, and if we do not find it in time, we will,
scientifically speaking, self-destruct.621 We don’t know when the time
is, but we do know this: if we do not protect life above liberty and
property, we, as a species, are more likely to face more significant
risks to our survival. We would be more negligent and selfdestructive. And more children would more likely face futures of
impoverishment, disease, and early death.
American law is positioned to help. By invoking the equivalent of
the medical principle commonly referred to as the Hippocratic Oath,
first do no harm, this constitutional interpretation can actively save

expensive, or our efforts may be too little and too late.”); see, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING,
supra note 17, at 179–80; DIAMOND, supra note 22, at 498; RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED
PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL 4 (1972); Francis, supra note 190,
at 4; GREGG EASTERBROOK, IT’S BETTER THAN IT LOOKS: REASONS FOR OPTIMISM IN AN AGE OF
FEAR 203 (2018) (arguing that rather than teetering on the edge of a cliff, we are merely
climbing higher than ever); GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS PARADOX: HOW LIFE GETS
BETTER WHILE PEOPLE FEEL WORSE 34 (2003) (claiming Americans were too pessimistic in the
face of increasing prosperity); JAMES HANSEN, STORMS OF MY GRANDCHILDREN: THE TRUTH
ABOUT THE COMING CLIMATE CATASTROPHE AND OUR LAST CHANCE TO SAVE HUMANITY 274
(2009); NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMATE 15 (2014);
ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 268–69 (2014) (“Right
now, in the amazing moment that to us counts as the present, we are deciding, without quite
meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed.
No other creature has ever managed this, and it will, unfortunately, be our most enduring
legacy.”); MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 346, at 3; REES, supra note 521, at 8; WILSON, supra note
521, at 19; WILSON, supra note 346, at xxiii (“We are inside a bottleneck of overpopulation and
wasteful consumption. If the race is won, humanity can emerge in far better condition than
when it entered, and with most of the diversity of life still intact.”).
619 See Draper, Risk Filters, supra note 24, at 343, 347.
620 See id.
621 See WILSON, supra note 521, at 19–20.
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lives.622 Further, and of great importance here in the Land of Liberty,
ranking rights actively promotes safe liberty and property so that
people can enjoy the beauty and the benefits of a life well lived. These
due process principles would have an active meaning for all. We
could express our interests and define our rights more clearly.
Let us use the ranking of basic rights in a positive way. We could
be more just. By changing our interpretation of the Due Process
Clauses, we can help Dr. King’s dream come true.623

622 See The Hippocratic Oath, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED., https://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek
/greek_oath.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
623 Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Address at the Lincoln Memorial
(Aug. 28, 1963). Ranking the basic rights of Due Process would help us better see all men by
the content of their character.

